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ARTICLES

RULEMAKING IN THE AGES OF GLOBALIZATION AND
INFORMATION: WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN FROM
EUROPE, AND VICE VERSA
Peter L. Strauss*
This Article stems from a project on European Union
Administrative Law undertaken by the American Bar Association's
Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice. It
explores the generation of normative texts by the Commission of
the European Union, its executive body, from the perspective of
Americans familiar with notice and comment rulemaking.
Legislative drafting (an exclusive responsibility of the
Commission), subordinate measures corresponding to American
rules and regulations, and soft law generated by the Commission
In creating legislative proposals, the
are all considered
Commission uses techniques quite like American rulemaking, but
with consultative practices (including electronic consultations)
that seem more conducive to dialogue, and less open to simple
grass-roots lobbying efforts. Soft law processes are also often
highly consultative. But subsidiary legislation (rules and
regulations, in American parlance) are generated following
procedures considerably less transparentand open to public input,
such as comitology, than oneftnds here.
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1.INTRODUCTION
Americans have, from time to time, trumpeted the virtues of the notice-andcomment rulemaking procedures their administrative agencies employ when
adopting regulations, and urged other nations to imitate their practice. Perhaps
noting our at least equally prominent moaning about the ossification of those
procedures, those nations have seemed to resist. At the same time, the ineluctable
forces of the information age are transforming politics, worldwide.
The
globalization of economic activity is motivating the creation of government
institutions that transcend national boundaries-and for that reason also outstrip
national political traditions. These institutions must find approaches to regulation
that can both satisfy divergent politics and elude the frustrating grip of those whose
activities require public controls. A study of the European Union's procedures for
generating regulatory norms suggests possible lessons both for America, and for the
Union.
On a spring day in April 2005, the International Herald-Tribune carried two
stories that framed the project. The front page story was headlined "On the EU
Battlefield: Armies of lobbyists assail Brussels,"' and opened with an account of
lobbyists' reaction to a European Commission decision that a vegetable sauce with
more than twenty percent lumps was itself a "vegetable" and so subject to tariffs as
much as twenty times higher than sauce as "sauce" would encounter. The American
public encountered comparable silliness when President Ronald Reagan's
administration wanted to treat tomato ketchup as a vegetable, to get credit for
supplying healthy foods in school lunch programs. "As the EU's powers have
extended even deeper into companies' lives," the Herald-Tribune wrote, "so the
interest of businesses in defending their causes on the legislative battlefield of
Brussels has intensified." The article was about companies and the thousands of
their lobbyists who now throng the EU capital, but it might as well have been about
citizens or NGOs-Friends of the Earth as well as Unilever are there and fighting.
Seven months later, The Wall Street Journal reported, to the same effect, on the
travails of the Kellogq Company trying to secure uniform access for its breakfast
cereals to EU markets.
Graham Bowley, On the EU Battlefield, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 5, 2005, at 1.
2

G. Thomas Sims, Uncommon Market; Corn Flakes Clash Shows the Glitches in European Union,

WALL ST. J., Nov. 1,2005, at Al.
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3
The second story was an op-ed piece, "EU's growth triggers identity crisis,"
addressing the prospect that the stress of European enlargement imperils the
European project at the very moment of an effort to adopt a European constitution,
then pending ratification. Just what is Europe, and why should anyone want it? The
questions were grounded in the reality of differing national ambitions and fears,
ambitions and fears having rather little to do with the technical rearrangements of the
draft "constitution, which few have read. By now," the Herald-Tribune wrote,
"approval of the constitution has been turned into a referendum on issues that have
little or nothing to do with the constitution, such as Turkish membership in the EU,
the Stability Pact, the Bolkstein directive on liberalizing rules for the service
industry, and local partisan rows."
While stunning defeats of the draft in referenda in France and the Netherlands
shortly consigned the draft constitution to oblivion, the EU continues to function
under its present treaty regimes. And that still has remarkable implications for
Europe's national governments. As one author recently wrote, "up to 90% of all
environmental legal acts within the national legal systems [of the European Union]
are of EU origin and national parliaments sometimes ... have nothing to do other
than simply transform European directives into national legislation."' This decline
in national parliaments gives the question how EU laws are formed particular
interest; to what extent are EU institutions under democratic control, to what extent
corporativist, etc.?
This Article is associated with a larger project carried out under the auspices of
the American Bar Association's Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory
Practice. The project as a whole is intended to help Americans understand the
administrative law of the European Union. This particular element of it is nominally
concerned with activities parallel to what American administrative lawyers know as
"rulemaking." It reports some observations on how the European Commission (the
EU executive) works to shape legal texts-statutes, regulations, even influential
advice-in comparison to American approaches, and in a context in which access,
transparency, influence, and accountability are increasingly important.
It seems useful to wam the reader at the outset that the comparison project is
imperfect in a variety of respects. To be wholly successful, any project in
comparative law had better aspire to understand the whole of the societies and
institutions being compared, not just pieces of them; and the very complexity of the
EU framework defeats that hope. The study draws on several studies of particular
sectors of the EU by experienced Brussels practitioners, undertaken with the helpful
advice of high-level Commission staff; and those reports reveal significant variation
in practice from sector to sector-despite the Commission's efforts to assure
uniformity. Beyond this, the study addresses only activities taking place at the
European level-in general, although not exclusively, within the EU itself. But
lawmaking in Europe is an intermixture of EU and Member State activity,

3 William Pfaff, EU's Growth Triggers Identity Crisis, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Apr. 5, 2005, at 7.
' Christoph Demmke, Comitology in the Environmental Sector, in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND
THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC 279, 279 (Mads Andenas & Alexander Turk, eds., 2000). A

footnote adds details: 35% in Denmark, 50% in Netherlands and Germany, 80% in the United Kingdom,
and up to 95% in Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Id.n.2.
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particularly when it comes to the adoption of measures to implement EU
legislation-the activity American lawyers would most readily identify as
rulemaking. While American analogies are available-for example, the EPA
oversees State Implementation Plans (that may involve state rulemaking activities)
as well as engaging in its own rulemaking-these analogies are not so well
developed in the American literature of administrative law, and the extent of
interpenetration in Europe is considerably greater. Any study would be complicated,
as well, by the variety of languages and political systems one would encounter
among the Member States.
The presentation following looks at European-level procedures for generating
abstract norms. It does so at three or perhaps four levels of decreasing formality,
proceeding from the more to the less formal; diversity increases as one descends.
European Union law can be framed within a nesting hierarchy that would be familiar
to Americans--or, for that matter, to the citizens of any modem, developed legal
order. At the highest levels of the legal order, one finds limited foundational
documents-a constitution, or treaties-that are the product of extraordinary
procedures rarely invoked and requiring demanding procedures for ratification as
well as adoption. At the next level, one finds laws, statutes, directly enacted by a
Congress or parliament, no more than a few hundred yearly. Beneath that,
subsidiary legislation or regulations adopted by executive authority-departments,
agencies, ministries-under legislative authorization; typically, at this level of detail,
thousands annually. Enabling legislation may authorize others than the executivesubordinate political units (states in the United States, Member States in the EU),
even private organizations--to adopt norms under conditions of supervision and,
perhaps, required procedure. These norms interact. Then one may find in still
greater profusion documents offering guidance or other forms of "soft law," not in
itself binding on citizens although still influential.
And this distribution of
normative instruments holds true for Europe. In 1996, for example, the European
Parliament and Council adopted 484 "legislative" acts; in the same year, following
very different processes and under rather light supervision, the European
Commission adopted 5147 "regulations," with a great deal of Member State
implementing measures, standards, organization measures, and uncounted "soft law"
below that.5
Any normative text embodies both a view of the realities with which it deals, we
could say technical or factual propositions about the real world to which it relates,
and a set of political or social propositions about desired, hopefully just, outcomes.
The tension between the idea of norms as the expression of a political judgment, and
norms as the product of an expert technical judgment, is felt differently at each level
of this hierarchy. Here's a concrete example in the American context.
* The American Constitution, in sweeping terms, authorizes Congress to legislate
5 Georg Haibach, Separation and Delegation of Legislative Powers: A Comparative Analysis, in
DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 53. To similar

effect, for different years and making comparisons to similar European national experience, see Gunther
Schafer, Linking Member State and European Administrations-the Role of Committees and Comitology,
in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 3, 6, 9; Josef

Falke, Comitology, From Small Councils to Complex Networks, in DELEGATED LEGISLATION AND THE
ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 331, 336.
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on matters affecting national commerce, in support of public safety and welfare. We
don't expect expert knowledge to have much if anything to do at the constitutional
level. Albeit premised on views of human nature that might or might not be valid,
the Constitution is expressed only as high politics; at most we sometimes ground
6 its
interpretation in propositions about the real world that draw on expert judgment.
* For the American Congress, whether and under what conditions to permit
nuclear generation of electric energy are judgments fundamentally controlled by its
members' assessments of nuclear power's risks, in itself and in relation to other
possible power sources (oil, for example). The legislature's work is the exercise of
ordinary politics, albeit that work is sometimes framed by views of the facts-on-theground that might be thought technical. Little Congress does is framed or credible
as the exercise of expert judgment; we commonly think of "legislative facts" as facts
that are acceptable to be determined by a vote. Any judicial check on such
legislative judgments rests either on sheer, demonstrable irrationality ("the world is
The
flat") or on inconsistency with the higher norms of the Constitution.
Constitution might not permit legislative judgments based on propositions about
racial difference, for example, even if in some technical sense the propositions were
true. Ordinarily, however, we accept that legislation is proper if a majority in the
legislature supports it-that is, what the majority believes the facts to be suffices.
* Once we get to the level of regulations, expert judgment about the facts begins
to count for a lot-although politics may still have a role to play. 7 Congress has
established a Nuclear Regulatory Commission to oversee nuclear power generation.
When its commissioners adopt a regulation about necessary levels of radiation
protection, their political authority as immediate delegates of Congress and
appointees of the American President may carry some weight for Americans aware
of the inevitable imprecision of human factual judgment about such matters. Still, at
this level, accuracy in assessing reality becomes much more important as a test of
legitimacy. We teeter between regarding regulators as persons whose authority and
actions are warranted by their apolitical expertise, and taking them as political agents
(in this case, of the chief executive) whose authority and actions are to be derived
not from facts they are uniquely positioned to assess, but from their relationship to
that principal. We are uncertain whether the process for creating regulations is one
designed for gathering and assessing facts, or one in which it is important that all
points of view can be expressed. American judges have created regimes of review,
"hard looks," that place a high value on factual accuracy and afford much less room
for politics than legislators enjoy.8
* "Soft law" say, policy advice--emerging from the Commission may be just as
political as regulations; but in technical agencies, at least, "soft law" is primarily the
product of subordinate bureaus, not the political leadership of the agency. And when
it is, with policy thus made at the greatest remove from political controls, we really
6 For example, that African-American school children are psychologically, developmentally
disadvantaged by segregated education. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
' On the interrelation of expert and political rationales of legitimacy, see Matthew Adler,

Justification, Legitimacy, and Administrative Governance, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE
REFORMATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW art. 3 (John F. Manning ed., 2005).
8 See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C.Cir. 1981); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC,
462 U.S. 87 (1983).
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expect/hope that expert judgment will prevail. When the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Bureau of Standards has issued a guidance document stating that a
containment four feet thick, built of concrete in a specified way, will provide a
required level of radiation protection for a nuclear power plant of a certain design,
we expect that document to stand or fall entirely on the basis of expert judgment.
The deeper one moves into the bureaucracy of administrative government, then, the
more important is the model of fact-finding expertise.
An American lawyer also approaches the creation of these differing normative
texts--constitutions, statutes, regulations, guidance documents-with a set of
institutional expectations that shape his understandings.
* Each of these levels--constitution, statute, regulation, soft law-is the product
of a distinct institution. The people, acting complexly through a variety of
institutions/agents, make constitutions; the legislature makes statutes; the political
leadership of an executive agency (or the courts) makes rules; the staff of a
subordinate bureau creates guidance documents. Different individuals and different
procedures are responsible for the wording of statutes, of regulations, and of advice.
a "Separation of powers" considerations, in the American perspective, sharply
differentiate legislative from executive authority and activity. Statutes are the work
of the legislature. The President can recommend legislation and can attempt to block
(veto) entire enactments of which he disapproves; but he cannot force consideration
of any measure and he scarcely participates in the work of its drafting and detailed
consideration. Regulations and soft law are the product of processes in which
neither the Congress as a whole nor any of its individual members are entitled
formally to exercise decisional authority, save for the possibility of enacting statutes
in disapproval. 9 (It is a matter in vigorous dispute whether the President, as distinct
from the government body the Congress has explicitly made responsible to act, is so
entitled.)
* There is the expectation, too, that the constitutionally established institutions
and their authority are quite fixed, not contingent. Since the Civil War at least there
has been no sense that the authority of Congress depends from day to day on the
continued acquiescence of states in a problematic union. When the President and the
executive branch act, they have at best a weak obligation to engage in consensual
dealings among executive authorities with equivalent responsibilities in the states.
* Within the executive itself, as remarked, the exact nature of presidential
authority over agency choices is unsettled. Do the agencies possess their own
authority, whose exercise the President merely oversees; or is their authority
necessarily derivative of his own, so that he may not only see to their faithful
execution of the laws but substitute his own judgment for theirs on disputable
matters? Whichever choice one makes between these contending views, to
Americans it is clear that the President is a popularly elected, and thus politically
accountable figure-essentially the only such figure in the executive1 °

9 This is hardly to deny the possibilities of informal influence, as by oversight hearings,
appropriations measures, casework, and the like.
10No one knows quite how to regard the Vice President, whose election follows from the
President's and whose constitutionally described functions are at least as much legislative (presiding in
the Senate, with a tie-breaking vote) as executive (substituting during periods of presidential incapacity).

2006] RULEMAKING IN AGES OF GLOBALIZATION & INFORMATION 651
Consequently they understand his exercise of authority to be hierarchical, not
democratic; Americans do not imagine the executive as a collective.
The tension between superior expertise and politics as the coin of bureaucratic
legitimacy, as well as the hierarchy of normative instruments will be familiar enough
to any citizen of a parliamentary democracy, but many of the forgoing propositions
will nonetheless seem strange. She may be used to governmental institutions in
which a principal (if not the dominating) executive figure, the prime minister, must
be a member of the legislature and is in a position to control both the introduction
and the ultimate passage of statutes. Ministers, what Americans would regard as
cabinet Secretaries, may also sit in Parliament; and in any event they are directly
answerable to it for the regulations adopted in their administrations. And the
parliamentary cabinet is much more a collective body - ministers often sharing
electoral responsibility with their Prime Minister; the duration of their government
depending both on its continuing success in parliament, and on the ministers'
continuing collective willingness to constitute a government. Much less likely is any
idea that the prime minister has a particular, unique, and electorally grounded
authority to dictate the proper outcome of any disputed matter within the executive.
For the European Union, in particular, the institutional context is quite different
to that of the United States. American expectations are out of place.
* Both as the child of treaties, and as a reflection of the content of those treaties,
the Union and its institutions are contingent on the continued interaction of states in
a way Americans may find hard to appreciate. Its primary laws are the product of
international concord, not popular will." Its institutional arrangements, and its civil
servants, need to be sensitive to the proposition that the Member States are nations,
and the EU is not. Those nations have linguistic identities (reflected in the
obligation to translate governing documents into all official languages of Member
States), unshared (and often long) histories and characters, and differing legal and
governmental institutions and orientations. Rivalries reflected in both diplomatic
and martial history stretch far into the past. Collective action at the European level
is far from instinctual, and almost invariably requires a level of integration of supranational and national effort Americans would find difficult to appreciate.
* One can construct its other normative documents in a hierarchy outwardly
similar to American expectations: "legislative acts" that are the product of what
might seem a bicameral legislature acting in coordination with an executive
authority; "rules" produced by the executive authority; and guidance emerging from
its bureaus. Yet strikingly, the European Commission, the Union executive,
unambiguously holds important responsibilities in the creation of all these
documents: the EU legislature can act only on proposals that come from it; the
Commission is the source of most pan-European "rules" or implementing measures
having the force of law; and soft-law guidance, as well, generally requires its
approval. And, on the other hand, this unity is undercut by the EU's sharply limited
direct authority to command; the bulk of implementation of EU legislative measures
is left to Member State initiative, under constrained circumstances of supervision.

1 The Draft European Constitution, had it been ratified, would not have been a "constitution" in the
usual national sense. Although titled a constitution, its text consistently presents itself as a treaty-as a
"We the States," not a "We the People" document.
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* The Commission's makeup reflects parliamentary rather than republican
expectations about executive structure: Its President is chosen by the legislature, not
by the people, and it acts collegially. Those in charge of its directorate generals (the
equivalent of ministers in a parliamentary system) hold an independent authority on
which in some sense the President depends.
* A number of elements make the Commission's ostensibly independent
policymaking responsibilities for implementation more an element of collective
responsibility, contingent both on national and international bureaucratic consensus,
than a node of independent institutional power. Comitology, a practice internal to
the EU that engages national representatives in discussions with responsible
Commission staff, is the most directly relevant of these for a discussion of EU
procedures. 1 2 But framework legislation is often designated for implementation at
the national level under Commission guidance, making this interdependence even
more clear.
Other measures frequently recognize significant standard-setting
authority in transnational standard-setting bodies outside the Council-CommissionParliament trilogy-international organizations like the Codex Alimentarius
Commission of the FAO and WHO, 13 dealing with food safety issues, independent
agencies such as the European Food Safety Authority, 14 and quasi-private standards
organizations such as CEN, the European Committee for Standardization.15 Save
perhaps for comitology committees, analogous institutions are not lacking in
American experience.
State implementation measures adopted under federal
supervision are characteristic of many spending (education, welfare) and regulatory
(environment, workplace safety) regimes; and at the state level, organizations like
ANSI (the American National Standards Institute) are often entrusted to a significant
degree to develop the technical standards underlying public regulation. Yet we are
used to thinking of administrative law in simpler ways, not in these terms.
* Finally, and quite strikingly from the perspective of the tension between
expertise and politics as the coin of legitimacy, the literature about the
Commission's actions consistently imagines Commission bodies to be expert as well
as consensual-their authority grounded in technocratic rather than political
judgment. Popular will is in some sense feared, while judicial checking of sums is
thought unnecessary, an invitation to unwonted legalism.
The contrasts with the American system, then, are striking-and in many
respects self-conscious.
What has already been said, particularly about the many diversities of the
Member States of the European Union, should suggest that considerations of
participation and transparency have great importance to any such undertaking. That
importance is heightened, in my judgment, by the proposition that we stand on the
cusp of an identity crisis in our relations to government generally, as the information
age transforms the relationships we can have with it, and it with us. Internet
resources may permit us to access and share governmental information more widely,

12 See supra Part III(a).

Codex Alimentarius Home Page, http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index-en.jsp.
" European Food Safety Authority Home Page, http://www.efsa.eu.int.
15 European Committee for Standardization Home Page, http://www.cenorm.be/cenorm/index.htm.
See supra Part II(c).
13
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and also to participate in policy formation by bringing our views to bear in a pointed
and timely fashion. Yet at the same time, these resources may magnify both the
possibilities for internal manipulation and control, and the possibilities for distorting
or at least obfuscating the public's will. To take two simple examples, looking in
opposite directions:
* Fifteen years ago, when government files were made of paper, discovering their
content even assuming they were public would have required me to go (or more
likely to hire an attorney to go) to them, sort through them hoping to find what I
wanted, and take notes or make physical copies. Today, sitting at a computer, I can
immediately access not only the proposals government agencies may have made for
rulemaking and a portal through which to comment on them, but also the comments
others have already filed, supporting studies, and (for rules already in place)
interpretations or guidance the responsible agency may have issued. The added
transparency, and its effect in freeing citizens from having to secure the services of
possibly expensive intermediaries, is stunning.
* Fifteen years ago, it would also have cost me physical effort and the price of a
postage stamp for each letter I wrote to Congress or an administrative agency, and
there would have been a postmark to tell the recipient where the letter came from.
None of this is true any longer. We have all learned to distrust the reality of
ostensible electronic return addresses; and profitable commercial ventures compete
to provide NGOs and others with the electronic wherewithal to make the most of this
essentially costless possibility for communication. What to make of an apparent
outpouring of public sentiment has become much more problematic.
This project seeks to effect a comparison between rulemaking procedures of the
EU and the United States at the second, third, and fourth levels of the hierarchy of
norms suggested above, limited to the EU itself (with minor attention to panEuropean standards organizations) and with particular attention to the use and impact
of internet resources.
II. FRAMING LEGISLATION
We start, then, with the framing of legislation-"statutes," in the American
context; "regulations" and "directives" under the current EU treaties.16 Like statutes,
"regulations" and "directives" have the force of law; but in a treaty-grounded
institution, they speak primarily to the membership of nation-states. "Regulations,"
a form less interesting to our study, may have direct legal effect permitting
enforcement by individuals.'7 Directives, by contrast, are legislative acts that "shall
'6 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3,art. 249 (ex
189) [hereinafter EC Treaty]. "Regulations" would have been denominated "European laws" and
"directives," "European framework laws" had the draft EU constitution been ratified-a usage less
confusing from the American perspective. Article 249 also refers to "decisions," binding in [their]
entirety upon those to whom [they are] addressed." Because they are addressed to named individuals,
"decisions" seem best characterized as executive, perhaps adjudicatory, acts rather than measures of
general applicability. They will not be further considered here. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA,
EU LAW-TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 115 (3d ed. 2003); KOEN LENHAERTS & PIET VANNUFFEL,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 780-81 (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed. 2005).
17 A "regulation" is a Community legislative act described in the EC Treaty as being "binding in its
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States." EC Treaty art. 249 (ex 189). "[lf they are
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be binding as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and
methods."' 18 This formulation self-evidently creates opportunities for delegation to
Member States, the principal source of implementing measures. Yet it also is the
source of delegations to EU authorities to set technical parameters within which the
Member States are to act. An example would be a directive requiring Member States
to prevent or limit pollution of water and air by ships;' 9 this directive entails
attention to, and parameters for, discharge provisions, construction requirements,
equipment requirements, and requirements for operational procedures; even if such a
directive itself set the initial parameters that state implementation must meet, it will
frequently authorize EU authorities to revise those parameters as developing
technology makes possible. As they "leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods," it would appear that directives create obligations that, at least in
formal terms, only the Commission can directly enforce.2 ° But the European Court
has found numerous respects in which directives may be given legal effect in private
litigation, even litigation between two private parties, leading to the observation that
"the distinction between directives and regulations remains salient in political terms
even while the legal consequences of their use are complex and confused.'
The discussion here will be limited to the framing of proposals for legislation,
treating debate and enactment as matters outside the purview of this Article.
Respecting the latter, it seems sufficient to remark that enactment procedures are
themselves set by the relevant treaty provisions. For binding legislative instruments
of general validity (i.e., regulations and directives), there are at present essentially
two types of legislative procedure-the consultation procedure and the co-decision
procedure. Of those, the more important is the co-decision procedure, a complex
process that generally allows the Council to act by "qualified majority" voting,
allows the Parliament to interact directly with the Council in the development of the
ultimate legislation, and gives it a veto over the terms of that legislation. Under
consultation procedure, much less frequently used as Parliament has gained in
stature, the Council must act unanimously, and while the Parliament must be
consulted, it has no direct right to participate in the development of the legislation
and no veto power.
The limitation of this study to the framing of legislative proposals may
immediately strike American readers as nonsensical. In the American context, the
drafting of legislation is not an important, and certainly not a public, procedural

immediately part of the domestic law of Member States [without requiring implementing legislation] there
is no reason why-so long as their provisions are sufficiently clear, precise and relevant to the situation of
an individual litigant-they should not be capable of being relied upon and enforced by individuals before
their national courts." CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 16, at 190.
18EC Treaty art. 249 (ex 189).
19 See, e.g., Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, 1973 (MARPOL 73/78).
20 EC Treaty arts. 226, 228.
21 CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 16,, at 227. See generally id. at 202. "The Legal Effects of
Directives"; SACHA PRECHAL, DtRECTIVES IN EU LAW (2d ed. 2005). For example, a directive will often
set a time by which compliance is required; after the expiration of that time, private parties may be able to
avail themselves of national non-compliance with the directive defensively in litigation with the noncomplying nation or its agencies.
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context. In formal terms legislative proposals come only from legislators. The
members of Congress are under no procedural obligations whatever to the outside
world in what they may choose to introduce as legislative business. One searches
congressional websites in vain-both the general website,22 and individual
committee websites-for signs of engagement with the public in the framing of
legislation. Each chamber has offices responsible for drafting desired legislation on
members' behalf; their use is not obligatory, however, and they deal only with the
members requesting their drafting help. Private citizens, more likely lobbyists or
NGOs, may draft proposed legislation, but they must persuade members to introduce
it.23

The American Constitution empowers the President to suggest legislation to
Congress, but the power to make suggestions is not uniquely his, and the fact that he
has made a suggestion does not create legislative business. His suggestion must be
introduced by a member of Congress, who is formally, if not always politically, free
to decline to do so, or to change its wording in any manner she chooses before doing
so. To be sure, the President has put in place internal procedures for controlling the
development of legislative recommendations; agencies must secure clearance from
the Office of Management and Budget before seeking congressional action, and that
obligation is used to effect a very useful coordination across the whole face of the
executive branch. But while it is always possible that the administration's friends
are engaged in this process, or that for some particular initiative-health care reform,
or the creation of an energy policy-the White House will establish a consultative
framework to shape its recommendations, none of this is commanded by law. There
are no equivalents in statutory development for the internet notices and consultations
that mark American rulemaking, now broadly exposed and engageable on the
internet. Neither are there American legislative equivalents of the public analytic
regimes agencies are required to follow in developing their rulemaking proposals.
True, Congress has instructed itself to engage in environmental, economic, and other
forms of analysis in connection with legislative work; and one can note in legislative
histories assertions that this required analytic work has been done. But participation
in and enforcement of these obligations are wholly internal matters; the public,
including in this respect the President and executive branch, are not involved.
The European Union, in contrast, operates within a regularized procedural
framework for the development of legislative proposals, as established by the EU
and EC Treaties. Under the treaties, as would have been continued by the draft
European Constitution, essentially all legislative business--that is, all proposals
considered by the Council and Parliament for actions that will have the force of law
on Member States and/or their citizens-must originate with the Commission. The
rationale behind entrusting the Commission with such a monopoly is to prevent the
submission of legislative proposals inspired by nationalistic interests that would lead
to the backsliding of Community legislation. The Parliament and the Council have
authority to amend and adopt such legislation (although the Council cannot directly

22 The Library of Congress, THOMAS Home, http://thomas.loc.gov.
23

Statutes regulating lobbying practice, requiring certain disclosures and placing limits on the

relationships between lobbyists and members, might be considered a limited form of public procedure
associated with legislation.
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amend a Commission proposal), 24 whose precise extent generally depends on the
type of legislation involved and the subject matter of the legislation. But the
Commission's monopoly of the right to initiate legislation gives it broad discretion
regarding the form, objective, content and the timing of any proposal, and the
authority to decide what kind of preparation work should be done before the actual
submission of the proposal to the other institutions. The existence of this framework
makes treatment of the procedures for developing legislative proposals sensible in a
study of European "administrative law."
Of course the political realities 5 give the Council and Parliament considerable
influence over what will emerge as the Commission's proposal. Nonetheless, it must
be the Commission that proposes. And while the Commission has felt free to
develop its own set of practices in a non-binding format that confers no judicially
enforceable rights on participants, an understandable regard for its credibility as an
institution has led the Commission to structure the path to legislative proposals in
ways that offer considerable transparency and opportunity for public contribution to
the process.
A. Notice of Development
Proposals emerge only because at some point it has been decided to develop
them. Useful generalizations about this initial stage are limited. Promptings from
Member States, the Council or the Parliament, lobbyists' suggestions, and
consideration internal to the Commission and/or its DGs are all possible choices.
Although the EC Treaty is silent as to internal processes the Commission must
follow before sending legislative proposals to the Council and the European
Parliament, the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty Amendments, without explicitly creating
private rights of enforcement, added a certain legal effect to the Commission's
political incentives. The Amendments required that:
4. For any proposed Community legislation, the reasons on which
it is based shall be stated with a view to justifying its compliance
with the principles

of subsidiarity and proportionality;

6

the

reasons for concluding that a Community objective can be better
achieved by the Community must be substantiated by qualitative

[C Treaty art. 250.
25Thus, what appears to be a fairly limited and general right of input under the present Treaties has
2E

in fact been used "to frame very specific proposals which it [the Council] wishes the Commission to shape
into concrete legislation." CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 16, at 69. The draft Constitution would have
made clear an expectation that legislative initiatives would in fact arise outside the Commission. See e.g.,
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) I, arts. 111-332 (majority
Parliamentary request for proposal, requires reasons for declination), 111-345 (majority Council request for
proposal, requires reasons for declination), & 1-47(4) (a million citizens from a significant number of
states may frame a request) [hereinafter Draft Constitution]. For a thoughtful analysis, see Paul Craig,
European Governance: Executive and Administrative Powers Under the New Constitutional Settlement,
3(2-3) INT'L J. CONST. L. 407 (June 2005).
26 The principles allocating responsibility as between the EU and its Member States-roughly, that
the EU may act only to the degree reasonable to secure its limited purposes and even then only in
circumstances, and to the extent, that its Member States are incapable by their own actions of achieving
them.
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or, wherever possible, quantitative indicators....
9. Without prejudice to its right of initiative, the Commission
should:
-except in cases of particular urgency or confidentiality, consult
widely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate,
publish consultation documents;
-justify the relevance of its proposals with regard to the principle
of subsidiarity; whenever necessary, the explanatory memorandum
accompanying a proposal will give details in this respect. The
financing of Community action in whole or in part from the
Community budget shall require an explanation;
-take duly into account the need for any burden, whether
financial or administrative, falling upon the Community, national
governments, local authorities, economic operators and citizens, to
be minimized and proportionate to the objective to be achieved;
The consequence is to create pre-proposal obligations of consultation and
analysis in conjunction with legislative proposals that might seem quite familiar to
persons acquainted with American agency rulemaking. The manner in which these
obligations are carried out is the business of the immediately following pages.
Preliminary stages may involve the preparation of Commission white papers or
green papers exploring policy alternatives-a stage that frequently involves its own
consultative processes, as discussed below both in general, 27 and in connection with
the proposed regulation of the chemical industry.28 The development of legislative
proposals are generally assigned to the Directorate General responsible for the
subject matter, which will begin informal consultations with Member State experts
and others as drafts are prepared. As with rulemakings in the United States, full
public engagement begins no later than the appearance of the project on the
takes to bring
Commission's work plan and--certainly relative to the time it usually
29
a proposal to finality-this brings the project into early public view.
The Commission's work plan is published in numerous formats at its worksite,
See infra p. 664 ff.
See infra, notes 54-60 and 78-88 and accompanying text.
29 Nonetheless, one encounters suggestions that pre-proposal consultation occur at an earlier stage,
and some provision for that by individual DGs. A study by the U.K.'s Better Regulation Task Force
included the following case study:
On 1 July 2005, DG SANCO introduced new guidelines on developing policy
proposals ... requir[ing] desk officers to produce a Scoping Paper - a single
document that sets out all the information necessary to discuss, launch and develop
an initiative from its inception to the time it is submitted to the Commissioner for a
decision. With certain exceptions, a Scoping Paper is required for all new
legislative proposals and non-legislative proposals leading to a Commission
decision.... Under this new system, by integrating stakeholder engagement into the
policy process from the very beginning, DG SANCO estimates that the first
informal consultations could take place as much as two and a halfyears before an
approved proposal is published in the Commission's Work Programme. (emphasis
added).
Better Regulation Task Force, Get Connected: Effective Engagement in the EU 29-30 (Sept. 2005),
available at http://www.brc.gov.uk/downloads/pdf/getconnected.pdf [hereinafter Get Connected].
27
28
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from a five-year strategic plan to a three month rolling programme.3 ° Perhaps the
most useful of these, because they contain contact information within the responsible
DG, are the "roadmaps '' 3 1Commission guidance requires its directorates to develop
32
and publish concerning the proposals adopted as elements of the APS and WP.
Like entries in the American regulatory agenda, these give a brief account of the
matters under development, following a uniform framework for preliminary impact

30See The Commission's Work Programme, http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/work_programme/
indexen.htm, In the following diagram, the APS is the Annual Policy Strategy, a general policy
document that sets out the priorities of the Commission for the following year. See Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Annual Policy Strategy, COM (2005) 73
final (March 2, 2005). It is generally adopted in February of the preceding year and takes the form of a
non-binding communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Although
a Commission document, it takes account of feedback received from the Parliament and the Council, and
can therefore be considered to be the result of an inter-institutional dialogue. The annual Commission
Work Programme, adopted in November of the year preceding the year during which it should be carried
out and then published, lays out how and where the Commission will act in order to pursue the priorities
and the key initiatives that were announced in the APS. Then each DG establishes an Annual
Management Plan (AMP) in order to translate the priority initiatives and the strategic objectives of the
Commission into concrete operations, and to provide an instrument enabling the management to plan,
follow up and report on all the activities and resources of each DG.

Strategic Planning and Programming Cycle
Synthesis

APS Decision
Year -1 (February)

Report

Preliminary

Year+] (June)

Annual Activity
Report
Year +1 (March)

draft budget
Year -I(April)
Commission
work Programme
Year -I(November)

Budget

Year -I (Decembet)
Operational
implementation
Year

Annual Management Plan
Year {Jantiary)

31 See Programming circular-Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2005, SEC (2004)

1175.
32 See Progress report on implementing better regulation for growth and jobs and up-date of the
Commission's Guidelines for Impact Assessment, SEC (2005) 790 (June 10, 2005) (putting the guidance
document before the Commission as an instrument intended to "clarify" and "reinforce" staff obligations
to provide roadmaps, consult widely, analyze impacts and alternatives, etc.); Impact Assessment
Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791 (June 15, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariatgeneral/
impact/docsen.htrr.
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analysis.33 They must provide, among other things, an estimate of the time required
3- See, e.g., Roadmaps: Commission Work Programme 2005, Roadmap 2005/ENTR/019, A
Proposal for a Regulation on the authorisation, supervision and vigilance of human tissue engineered
products, at 10, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/off/workjprogramme/20050128_clwproadmaps.
pdf. The roadmap states in its entirety:
Lead DG and contact person: DG ENTR, F/3 - Christian Siebert, Deputy HoU
Expected date of adoption: June-July 2005
A. Initial impact assessment screening
1. What are the main problems identified?
"Human tissue engineered products" are engineered human cells and tissues developed according to
specific processes in order to maintain, restore or improve diseased/injured tissues in the human body.
Existing EC legislation does not address these products in a specific and comprehensive manner.
Although Directive 2004/23/EC has recently introduced minimal rules on the quality and safety of human
tissues and cells, it leaves room for more detailed requirements on manufactured products derived from
tissues and cells. In the absence of a fully harmonised regulatory framework, Member States apply
different requirements for the manufacture and authorisation of human tissue engineered products. This
results in obstacles to intra-community trade. Regulatory discrepancies restrict patients' access to
innovative tissue engineering therapies and may act as barriers to guaranteeing a high level of public
health protection in the European Union.
2. What are the main policy objectives?
The main objective of the proposal is to improve the free movement of human tissue engineered
products in the European Union, while guaranteeing a high level of safety for European patients.
3. What are the policy options? What regulatory or non-regulatory instruments could be considered?
Given the potential health risks associated with human tissue engineered products, the only policy
instrument to be envisaged is a binding legal act. Different options are currently under consideration with
a view to establishing an authorisation procedure which guarantees the quality, safety and efficacy of
human tissue engineered products. It is essential to provide a coherent and stable regulatory framework,
which is strictly enforced in all Member States where human tissue engineered products are manufactured
or imported. A regulation is therefore envisaged. It will facilitate the application of common rules in the
absence of specific national legislation on human tissue engineered products in some Member States.
4. What are the impacts likely to result from each policy option and who is affected? Which
impacts are likely to warrant further analysis (cf. list of impacts in the enclosed guide)?
The proposal will be based on the results of studies carried out by the Joint Research Centre's
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (JRC-IPTS) of the European Commission. These studies
will analyse the economic, social and environmental impacts of the proposal. Ethical aspects will also be
considered in collaboration with the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE).
The main parties that will be affected by the proposal are tissue engineering companies and,
possibly, some hospitals and tissue banks.
B. Planning of further impact assessment work
5. What information and data is already available? What further information needs to be gathered?
How will this be done (e.g. internally or by an external contractor) and by when?
The JRC-IPTS has already completed a study on the current European market in human tissue
engineered products and its future developments (http://www.jrc.es). The assessment of economic, social
and environmental impacts of the proposal is currently under way. Ethical impacts are also being
considered. The impact assessment is expected to be completed during the first quarter of 2005 at the
latest.
6. Which stakeholders & experts will be consulted, how and at what stage?
Extensive consultations have already taken place with Member States and interested parties
(consultation on the need for legislation in 2002; public consultation document and stakeholders'
conference in April 2004; several consultation meetings with Member States and industry
representatives). Discussions have highlighted a fairly broad consensus, in particular amongst industry
and governments, in favour of a specific EU regulatory framework for human tissue engineered products.
The proposal also responds to requests for harmonisation by leading Members of the European
Parliament. The results of public consultations are available at http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F3/humantissue/index.htm. Dialogue with the main stakeholders will be maintained during the preparation of the
draft proposal.
7. Will an inter-service steering group be set up for the IA?
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for completing the IA, as well as a brief statement on (1)the likely impacts of each
policy option, (2) which impacts warrant further analysis, (3) who is likely to be
affected, and (4) an outline of the consultation plan.34 Of particular importance for
interested persons outside the Commission and any groups it may itself invite to
participate in consultations, the roadmaps identify contact persons, sometimes
including their telephone extensions; this easily permits an outsider early selfidentification to responsible bureaucrats as a stakeholder or other interested party.
The roadmap identifying numbers, unsurprisingly, correspond to those identified in
the work programme. While it is hard to assess whether the obligation to produce
roadmaps is universally complied with (as one might also say about the Federal
Regulatory Agenda that is the American equivalent), the Commission "Guidelines
stress the importance of comprehensive and high-quality Roadmaps to allow
interested parties to see what the Commission has done and still plans to do, thereby
facilitating the preparation of their input as part of the mandatory consultation
process." 35
B. Impact Assessmen?

6

Impact assessment, proportionate to the significance of the action being
undertaken, is a required element of the Commission's development of legislative
proposals. For the Commission, but not for the American Congress, this is a
seriously considered obligation, albeit one that like the American counterpart for
regulations, E.O. 12,866, is enforced solely by internal means. 37 The Commission
maintains a dedicated impact assessment website with links to all documents,38
including most impact assessments that have been completed.3 9 Effective as of

No. However, DG Enterprise is working in close cooperation with other Commission services (DG
Sanco, DG Research and other interested services).
14 The Roadmap must also indicate whether an Inter-Service Steering Group
will be established.
See the discussion of such a group infra Part IV. When a DG does not plan to convene such a group, it
must provide reasons.
" Progress report on implementing better regulation for growth and jobs and up-date of the
Commission's Guidelines for Impact Assessment, SEC (2005) 790, supra note 32, at 3 (emphasis in
original).
36 In considering the Union's impact assessment procedures, this report does not concern itself
with
disputes regarding their possible political tendencies to permit or promote excessive regulation, as some
assert. See Lawrence Kogan, Exporting Precaution: How Europe's Risk-free Regulatory Agenda
Threatens American Free Enterprise (Washington Legal Foundation 2005), available at
http://www.wlf.org/upload/110405MONOKogan.pdf. The new guidance document, it may be observed,
seems intended to promote greater use of quantification and monetization of anticipated impacts for major
proposals. Progress report on implementing better regulation for growth and jobs and up-date of the
Commission's Guidelinesfor Impact Assessment, SEC (2005) 790, supra note 32, at 3.
"7Communication from the Commission on Impact Assessment, COM (2002) 276 final (June 5,
2002). Precursor regimes required analysis of budgetary impacts, and impacts on small and medium sized
enterprises. Guidance issued during the summer of 2005 considerably strengthened the analytic
requirements involved. Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32.
38 Impact
assessment in the Commission:
Introduction, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
secretariat general/impact/indexen.htm.
31 Impact assessment in the Commission:
Impact Assessment in Practice, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/secretariatgeneral/impact/practice-en.htm. A small number of the statements here are restricted
from public access.
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2005, all items on the Commission's legislative and work programme require impact
assessment. A preliminary assessment appears in the roadmap document; an
extended impact assessment accompanies the proposal to Commission for approval
and then to the Council and Parliament, at which time it is made available on the
web. That it is developed in two stages, with the first appearing in the published
"road maps" and including contact information, effectively assures interested parties
an opportunity to make their views heard.
The mechanics of and general adherence to this guidance are, necessarily, works
in progress. Prior to the communications of 2002, practice was highly variable from
directorate general to directorate general. The new guidelines of June 2005-issued
in the shadow of the rejection of the draft Constitution in France and the Netherlands
and so perhaps signaling renewed Commission awareness of its need to build
credibility-promise yet more disciplined attention to the process. Under the 2005
Impact Assessment Guidelines, the impact assessment process has six basic steps:
* What is the problem?
" What are the objectives?
" What are the policy options?
" What are the likely economic, social and environmental impacts?
* How do the options compare?
40
• How could future monitoring and evaluation be organized?
What the Commission means by "impact assessment" differs somewhat from
how Americans would understand the process. The Commission published an initial
guidance document, "Impact Assessment in the Commission," in the fall of 2002, 4 '
elaborating the expected processes for developing both preliminary and extended
Impact assessments, with models for each. This document made clear that these
analyses were seen as aids to a political process, and thus might often be
appropriately qualitative in character. It strongly emphasized the obligation of
consultation with interested parties and relevant experts. "Consultation with
interested parties is an important part of the impact assessment process, and is
carried out according to a set of minimum standards." 2 These minimum standards
were themselves specified in Commission communications 43 and the consultations
are conducted through the Commission's "your voice" website. "In order
to be
4
credible, impact assessment cannot be carried out behind 'closed doors.'
The 2002 Communication described the desired analysis in terms much broader
than might be familiar to American audiences. Impact analysis was presented as a
technique for identifying policy options and alternatives by considering the likely
forward consequences of a proposed action, as it would also be seen in the United
states. Yet for the Commission, these impacts were to be "expressed in economic,

40 Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32, at 2-3 (Table of Contents).
4, Impact Assessment in the Commission:
Guidelines (2002), http://europa.eu.int/comm/
secretariatgeneral/impact/docs/ia technical_guidelines en.doc [herinafter Initial Guidance Document].
42 See
The
impact
assessment
process:
Consultation
and
use of expertise,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat general/impact/experten.htm.
4' Communication on General principles and minimum standardsfor consultation of interested

parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final (Dec. It, 2002); Communication on Principlesand
Guidelines- "Improvingthe knowledge base for better policies,"COM (2002) 713 final (Dec. 11,2002).
" Initial Guidance Document, supra note 41, at 9.
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social and environmental terms," (emphasis added) with no particular emphasis on
quantification or cost-benefit balancing.45 "[S]trict cost-benefit analysis may not
always supply the most relevant information; for example, the degree of
irreversibility ...[t]he precautionary principle ...[and the] impact on established
policy objectives ... should be assessed."4 American authors have criticized this
aspect sharply, urging the EU to "specify[] that the primary objective of regulation is
'
to maximize net benefits."47
Yet these authors do not appear to recognize the rather
different institutional function that impact assessment serves in the European
context; they rely on data much of which is national in character and largely predates
the recent Commission measures.
One hundred pages of supplementary guidelines and illustrative annexes
published in the summer of 200548 offered a basis for "rigorous and comprehensive
analysis... easily accessible to the non-specialist.' 49 Yet, like its predecessor, the
new guidance does not supply any single, or binding, decision criteria. It notes that
Impact Assessment is a decision tool, but that it will not govern the "political"
decision of the Commission, much less that of the Parliament or the Council. The
new Guidance does, however, go much further than prior guidance both in
"screening" to arrive at a shortlist of options (using the criteria of "effectiveness,
efficiency, and consistency") and in structuring the consideration and ranking of
options. It requires that for all options considered, which must include the "no
action" option, the Impact Assessment Report must "consider all the relevant
positive and negative impacts alongside each other, regardless of whether they are
expressed in qualitative, quantitative or monetary terms. ' 50 While the Commission
presents this approach as a "simple multi-criteria analysis," and carefully
distinguishes it from the alternative approaches of "cost-benefit analysis, which
compares positive and negative impacts expressed in the same units, normally in
monetary terms, and cost-effectiveness analysis, which compares the costs of
achieving a given objective," in fact the approach suggested by the Commission is
compatible with what is commonly considered cost-benefit analysis in the United
States, where the term "formal" or "quantified" cost-benefit analysis is normally
properly reserved for the fully quantified type of assessment. 5'

" For an examination of the EU directives specifically concerning environmental assessments, see
Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, Lav and "New" EnvironmentalGovernance in the European Union, in NEW
GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE US (G. de Burca & J. Scott eds., 2005).
Addressing its procedures requiring provision for public participation at the local level, they find
democratizing tendencies supportive of new governance ideas "a more inclusive, less technicist
environmental assessment procedure, with public involvement in decision making expressed in the
manner of an entitlement to participate and to access to the courts to enforce its provisions." Id. at 6.
'6Communication from the Commission on Impact Assessment, at 15-16, COM (2002) 276 final.
4' Robert Hahn & Robert Litan, Counting Regulatory Benefits and Costs: Lessonsfor the US and
Europe, 8(2) J. INT'L ECON. L. 473, 473 (2005); see also Kogan, supra note 36.
's Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32.
41 Progress report on implementing better regulation for growth and jobs and up-date of the
Commission's Guidelines for Impact Assessment, SEC (2005) 790, supra note 32, at 2-3 (emphases in
original).
50 Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32, at 39 (emphasis in original).
"' On the other hand, when the Commission defines "multi-criteria analysis" in its Annex to the
Impact Assessment Guidelines. Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, Annex 13.3, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat__general/impact/docs/SEC2005 791_IA guidelines-anx.pdf. It does
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Bear in mind that we are here discussing the development of legislative
proposals, matters to be submitted to Parliament and the Council. Impact assessment
is not required for executive implementing measures, what Americans would call
rulemaking. This choice is perhaps a reflection of where the most important
measures will be undertaken, but it is also one of several elements of EU
arrangements tending to separate the technical from the political in the development
of legislation. Impact analyses, then, operate more for the control/edification of the
external institutions to whom legislative proposals are eventually sent, the Council
and the Parliament, than for the Commission itself. Decisions subject to comitology
do not appear in the Work Programme, and are normally exempt from the procedure.
The contrast with American practice could hardly be more striking. In the
United States, impact analysis is principally understood as a technique by which the
President may discipline and influence executive action; although impact analysis is
also promised in connection with legislative measures, it has yet to be seriously
undertaken in that context. For the EU, impact assessment is much more a device
for informing legislators than for controlling a dispersed bureaucracy.
In the United States, impact analysis is less consistently a public process.
Regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality require agencies to use noticeand-comment procedures when making environmental impact analyses, thus
involving the public; 52 and Regulatory Flexibility Act analyses for impact on small
business may also involve public consultations. Yet open consultations generally are
not conducted for today's most important form of impact analysis, economic impact
analysis made under EO 12866. To be sure, one may be able to learn when an EIS
has been submitted for review by careful observation of the website maintained by
OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Analysis. This posting occurs,
however, only after the agency hopes to have completed its analysis; OIRA does not
make the documents public or directly invite public participation, and the eventual
inclusion of the documents in the agency's rulemaking docket may come too late for
effective commentary on it.
The EU's initial guidance documents require those responsible for impact
assessment consultations not only to summarize their results, but also to "indicate
how the consultation influenced the development of the proposal, and any remaining
critical or dissenting opinions."53 The character of an extended impact assessment
document completed under the initial guidelines can perhaps be appreciated by
looking at the report developed for the Commission initiative known as REACH
(Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restrictions of CHemicals), 54 one of the
more controversial legislative actions proposed in recent years, that in April 2005
had not yet reached its conclusion. The proposal, captured in six enormous files on
the Commission's website,55 runs about 1200 pages (mostly technical annexes the

not require that a "net benefits" hurdle or a "maximizing net benefits" test be used for multi-criteria
analysis.
52 See Scoping, 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (requirement) and Notice of Intent, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.22
(substance to be included).
53 Initial Guidance Document, supra note 41, at 27.
5' Extended Impact Assessment, SEC (2003) 1171/3 (Oct. 29, 2003), concerning Proposalfor a
New EU Regulatory Frameworkfor Chemicals-REACH,COM (2003) 644 final (Oct. 29, 2003).
55Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the
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Commission, characterized as not new5 6); the extended impact assessment, quite
general (albeit well-informed about the character of the European chemical industry,
its environmental impacts, and the cost-effectiveness and benefits in general of the
measures proposed), comprises thirty-three pages.57 One could compare the recently
adopted American regulation on tire pressure monitoring (a simpler subject) for
which the rule itself comprised seven pages in the Federal Register,5 and the Final
Regulatory Impact Analysis published on the agency website ran 249 pages.59
Under the Commission's 2005 guidance, still, an Impact Assessment Report should
be no longer than thirty pages (excluding annexes), following a set format.60
C. Stakeholder Consultation (andReport)
The Commission is committed to extensive consultations with all concerned
elements of society as part of its process for developing legislative proposals. It has
carried this commitment through in a series of Communications61 and websites
committed in various ways to the process.62 Although it is grounded in the
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH), establishing a European
Chemicals Agency and amending Directive 1999/45/EC and [...] Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 67/548/EEC in order to adapt it to Regulation
(EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the registration, evaluation, authorisation
and restriction of chemicals, COM (2003) 644 final (Oct. 29, 2003), available at http://europa.eu.intleurlex/en/com/pdf/2003/com2003_0644en.html.
- Press Release, European Commission, Commission publishes draft new Chemicals Legislation
for consultation (May 7, 2003), http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/
646&format='HTML&aged= I &language=EN &guiLanguage=en.
"7 For an account of initial experience with Impact assessments, see Report on European
Governance (2003-2004), SEC (2004) 1153 (Sept. 22, 2004) and Report from the Commission: "Better
Lawmaking 2003, "at Annex 3, COM (2003) 770 final (Dec. 12, 2003). At least initial experiences with
Impact assessments suggested that they could be highly politicized. Bignami recalls that when she was
reviewing the bargaining history of the Data Protection Directive, there was a tiff about the regulatory
impact statement: the Commission produced one; the United Kingdom, antagonistic to the entire
Directive, said it wasn't good enough and produced its own showing how burdensome the Directive would
be; and the Commission produced another, more favorable one. Thus, a possible question for sectoral
reporters: how extensive are the Commission's regulatory Impact assessment statements in your field?
Have you noticed any recent changes in practice?
5' Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, 70 Fed. Reg. 18,184 (Apr. 8, 2005). The statement of
basis and purpose accompanying the rule ran 49 pages. Id. at 18, 136.
51 See National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Final Regulatory Impact Analysis, Tire
Pressure Monitoring System, FMVSS No. 138 (Mar. 2005), at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf9l/
325337 web.pdf.
6o Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32, at 14.
61 See Commission Proposal for General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation
of
Interested Parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 277 final (June 5, 2002). Comments on this
Commission Proposal, collected at the Commission's website, see Consultation Standards,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariatgeneral/sgc/consultation/histoen.htm, led to two final documents:
Commission Communication Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and Dialogue--General
Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested Parties by the Commission, COM
(2002) 704 final (Dec. 11, 2002) and Commission Communication on the Collection of Expertise by the
Commission: Principles and Guidelines, COM (2002) 713 final, (Dec. 11, 2002).
62 See, e.g., Your Voice in Europe (where consultations are conducted and reported upon),
http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/consultations/indexen.htm; CONECCS Home, Consultation, the European
Commission and Civil Society (providing a database of consultative bodies and civil society
organizations), http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil society/coneccs/index-en.htm.
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Amsterdam Treaty Amendments of 1999, the Commission has expressed its
commitment in soft law terms that do not create enforceable rights in private
parties.63 Its explanation of this choice both illustrates the importance of soft law in
its practice and the Commission's determination to avoid precise imitation of
American institutions as it understands them:
Some of those consulted questioned the Commission's decision to
set consultation standards in the form of a Commission
communication (i.e., in the form of a policy document) instead of
adopting a legally-binding instrument. They argued that this
would make the standards toothless and the Commission would be
unable to ensure the consistency and coherence of its consultation
processes.
However, the Commission remains convinced that a legallybinding approach to consultation is to be avoided, for two reasons:
First, a clear dividing line must be drawn between consultations
launched on the Commission's own initiative prior to the adoption
of a proposal, and the subsequent formalised and compulsory
decision-making process according to the Treaties. Second, a
situation must be avoided in which a Commission proposal could
be challenged in the Court on the grounds of alleged lack of
consultation of interested parties. Such an over-legalistic approach
would be incompatible with the need for timely delivery of policy,
and with the expectations of the citizens that the European
Institutions should deliver on substance rather than concentrating
on procedures.
Moreover, the fear expressed by some participants in the
consultation process that the principles and guidelines could
remain a dead letter because of their non-legally binding nature is
due to a misunderstanding. It goes without saying that, when the
Commission decides to apply the principles and guidelines, its
departments have to act accordingly.64
63 As
reflected in the Environmental Sector Report for this study, available at
http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/eu/SectRptRule-environmental.pdf at 60, stronger commitments have
been undertaken, in the environmental context only, pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of the Aarhus
Convention. See, e.g., U.N. Economic Commission for Europe Committee on Environmental Policy,
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in
Environmental Matters, Aarhus, Denmark, arts. 6 & 7 (June 23-25, 1998), available at
http://www.mem.dk/aarhus-conference/issues/public-participation/ppartikler.htm.
6' Communication on General principles and minimum standardsfor consultation of interested
parties by the Commission, COM (2002) 704 final (Dec. II, 2002) (emphasis added). The guidance
documents of June 2005 equally forcible about staff obligation; while the increasing stringency of the
commitments is clear, empirical data on the extent of compliance with them are hard to obtain. See
Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32.
The U.K.'s Better Regulation Task Force, in its Get Connected: Effective Engagement in the EU
report, both expressed "surprise[] that the Commission does not publish information about how well
individual Directorates General comply with the agreed standards for consultation," thinking that
information a part of the citizen's "right to know," and indicated agreement with the soft law approach.
"The problem with a legally binding requirement to consult is that it creates an opportunity and perhaps
even an incentive for those dissatisfied with a particular policy outcome to challenge proposals in court on
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Recall that these are principles developed and, as the contents of the Your Voice
site65 suggest, most often honored in connection with the development of legislative
drafts, not rulemaking.
A recent assessment of the Commission's consultation practice welcomed its
implementation but questioned whether-particularly in light of the June 2005
impact assessment guidelines66 -the "principles and standards for consultation
should only apply to major policy initiatives. ' '6 7 "Even where the general principles
and minimum standards are applicable," the report continued:
[T]hey are not binding on the Commission services. While we
have found good examples of thorough and extensive consultation,
we have also found that many consultation exercises fail to meet
the Commission's minimum standards and that compliance is
patchy both between and within Directorates General.
We have found it difficult to make a reliable assessment of
compliance with the minimum standards as information is not
easily available and some of them are anyway qualitative.
Nevertheless, in June 2005 we reviewed all the open and closed
consultations on the Commission website and found that nine out
of 40 consultations (or 23%) allowed less than eight weeks to
respond. Two consultations were barely eight weeks long and
took place over the Christmas period. Of the other standards, the
Commission itself acknowledges that it needs to do better in
providing reasoned feedback to respondents and in demonstrating
how it has taken account of their views.68
It is perhaps remarkable to American readers, but entirely consistent with EU
expectations, that this somewhat critical, external report rejected any suggestion that
the consultation mechanism be made legally binding.
The problem with a legally binding requirement to consult is that it
creates an opportunity and perhaps even an incentive for those
dissatisfied with a particular policy outcome to challenge
proposals in court on the grounds of inadequate consultation. This
would prolong the legislative process and introduce considerable
uncertainty over when and how any legislation enters into force
.... The United States puts a legal duty on government agencies
to consult to a minimum standard on significant proposals. There
is no equivalent legal duty anywhere in the EU and we do not
think it proportionate to introduce one.69
Given the EU's dependence on continued acceptance of its initiatives by its
Member States, one easily understands that the public processes of stakeholder

the grounds of inadequate consultation .... We want to find ways to help the Commission's consultation
process become more effective and efficient, not to slow down the delivery of policy or to enrich the legal
profession." Get Connected, supra note 29, at 3, 25.
65 Your Voice in Europe, supra note 62.
66 Impact Assessment Guidelines, SEC (2005) 791, supra note 32.
67 Get Connected, supra note 29, at 22.
68 Id. at 24.
69 Id. at 25.
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consultation are hardly the only means by which the Commission's bureaucrats
inform themselves about pending issues. 70 Nor would one wish to suggest that
members of Parliament or the Council, who will eventually have to act on
Commission proposals (and so wish to maneuver to shape their development), learn
their constituencies' views only in this way. Political pressures and lobbying in all
its forms are only to be expected. 7' Yet the use of stakeholder consultations as a
routine means of exploring public views across the whole of the European spectrum,
and the manner in which they are treated both by respondents and by the
Commission itself, offer a striking contrast to the American framework for
legislative development.
Perhaps because these consultations are undertaken at an early stage in the
development of proposals for legislation, before a proposal has assumed concrete
form, they have a different character than what might be thought the American
analog, the "notice" American agencies publish in connection with notice and
comment rulemaking. In usual American practice, the draft is created first and the
public consulted afterwards, and this has a number of consequences. First, it
contributes to a certain rigidity and defensiveness on the agency side; the process of
creating the draft is itself political-compromises need to be made within the
drafting body and stances taken, that may then be difficult to depart from whatever
input is received. Second, it can emphasize the political character of the response to
the proposal from the public side. While some commentators may respond to

70

Two specific advisory bodies-the European Economic and Social Committee (representing

various socio-economic organizations in Member States) and the Committee of the Regions (made up of
representatives of local and regional authorities)--as well as Member States are regularly consulted.
Special committees may also be used for this purpose, of course. See, e.g., Commission Decision
concering the creation of an advisory group on the food chain and animal and plant health 2004/613/EC,
2004 O.J. (L 275) 17. See Food Safety--Committees-Advisory Group, http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/
committees/advisory/index en.htm. One might analogize a committee with this function to the groups
formed under the American Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a. The formation process in
the EU, if the documents at this site are typical, invite general applications, and the Commission then
selects committee members on such bases as their pan-European character and potential contribution to
the group as a whole. The 36 organizations selected for this committee appear to have these
characteristics, including NGOs as well as industrial representatives, and unions, federations,
organizations, etc. See List of members of the advisory group on the food chain and animal and plant
health, 2005 O.J. (C 97) 2 (three seats allocated to the European Consumers Organization "in order to
facilitate the representation of European consumer.").
Unlike the NRA, no process external to
Commission politics is provided for testing the Commission's success in achieving a representative body.
This is no different from many other respects in which EU law eschews formal legalisms; while the
Commission's incentives suggest that they might rarely if ever be necessary, one arguable result is to keep
advice within an "establishment" community, even if a broadly representative one.
One public indicator of the establishment characteristic of this consultative activity is the
Commission's CONECCS site, which lists both the Commission's formal or structured consultative
bodies, in which civil society organizations participate, and the non-profit making civil society
organizations, organized at European level, from which those consultative bodies tend to be drawn.
CONECCS Home, Consultation, the European Commissions and Society (CONECCS),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/civilsociety/coneccs/indexen.htm.
Looking the other way is the
Commission's assertion on its general "civil society" site that "there is no general registration or
accreditation system for interest groups. The Commission does not want to limit its consultations to a
certain number of pre-screened or accredited organisations."
Civil Society, General Overview,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil_society/apgenen.htm.
71 See infra notes 88 and 93 and accompanying text.
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particular details of a concrete proposal, the process is entirely open-ended, and this
invites broadside responses and political campaigns. With the internet and the
development of tools for waging political campaigns there,72 one can find
rulemakings with hundreds of thousands of participants, many of whom submit
electronic forms with unverifiable identities.73 As thus structured, participation is
essentially costless and easily faceless.
In contrast, Commission consultations tend to be quite structured in character,
requiring responses to a series of questions about identity and interest and then
asking particular questions about the matter under study.74 The result is to require a
not insubstantial investment of time in participation and, one imagines, to retard, if
not entirely defeat, computerized response campaigns. This in and of itself may
significantly improve the contributions the process makes. One recent study of
American rulemaking reached the conclusion, surprising to its authors, that "the vast
majority of significant differences in [the] study turned out to be not between
electronic and paper submitters as we had originally proposed, but between those
who submit original comments and those who submit form-based comments.,, 75 If
the tendency of the Commission's approach is to suppress form-based comments,
these results suggest, the result will be a more credible and rationalized process. The
Commission's policies, set out in its consultation documents, 76 require reporting of
results and feedback; reports of closed consultations are made in a statistical way on
the Yourvoice site.77
The ongoing REACH process, already encountered,78 can perhaps stand as an
example of the practice and possible extent of consultation undertaken by the
Commission in the course of preparing legislative proposals-although its
contentiousness, evident in the dimensions about to be recounted, counsels some
caution. A Commission white paper-that is, a preliminary policy analysis-was
published in February of 2001, itself the product (in part) of a meeting "with more

72

See supra pp.. 652-53.

73 For an analysis of the difficulties as well as a resourceful empirical study, see David Schlosberg,

Stephen Zavestoski & Stuart Shulman, "To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That is the (Real)
Question ":
Deliberation
and Mass Participation in US. Regulatory Rulemaking,
http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.edu/doc/papers/SDESTWestern 05.pdf (2005); see also eRulemaking
Research Group at the University of Pittsburgh, http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.edu (last modified Mar. 20,
2006).
74 This is particularly the case for consultations undertaken through its approach to "interactive
policy making." See Interactive Policy Making, http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/ipm/index en.htm. For an
example of a consultation that closed in May 2005 on the sustainable use of pesticides in Europe, see
Sustainable Use of Pesticides, http://europaeu.int/comn/environment/ppps/home.htm. On the relevant
site one finds not only the questionnaire, but links to various documents concerned with it that may assist
in understanding or responding to it.
75 Schlosberg et al., supra note 73, at 22-23. Differences, all favorable to the engagement
of those
submitting original rather than form comments, concerned how much information the commenter
received, whether others' inputs were considered, whether other comments were reviewed, whether a
greater understanding of other positions emerged, and whether the commenter's own position had at all
changed.
76

See supra note 64.

See, e.g., Response Statistics for "The Transparency of Regulations and Standards in the Area of
Services," http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/results/services/index en.htm (July 19, 2004); Review of the
New Approach, http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/results/4/indexen.htm (Mar. 31, 2002).
78 See supra, notes 54-60 and accompanying text..
77
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than 150 stakeholders in February 1999-regulators, scientists, industry,
environmental, and consumer NGOs as well as representatives from applicant
countries., 79 There followed stakeholder conferences on the white paper in April
200180 and May 200281, and a November 2003 workshop 82 on the extended impact
assessment, all thoroughly documented on the REACH website. From May to July
2003, the Commission conducted a consultation on its draft; 83 it attracted an unusual
level of response-again, one thoroughly documented on its website:
968
participants in an Interactive Policymaking tool that was, in part, a structured
questionnaire,84 and a total of 6400 comments of varying length and detail.85 It
seems useful to reiterate here that, in contradistinction to American rulemaking
processes of equivalent controversiality, virtually all these comments appear to have
spoken to the proposals in knowledgeable detail; even in those relatively rare
instances in which a number of people (say, workers at a given chemical plant 86) are
identified as having submitted identical comments, the comments (doubtless
supplied by their employer and/or union) are detailed.87
In this particular proceeding, there is one artifact more reminiscent of the
American scene, a declaration signed by 429 organizations and 22,464 citizens,
submitted as part of the internet consultation, and so accessible from the REACH
site.88 Here, very clearly, is an effort at political, not intellectual or technical,
influence. Yet the very structure of the declaration's site, 89 linked to the REACH
79 Commission White Paper on Strategyfor a Future Chemicals Policy, at 6, COM (2001) 88 final
(Feb. 27, 2001).
' Stakeholders' Conference on the Commission's White Paper on the Strategy for a Future
Chemicals Policy, http://europa.cu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/whitepaper/conferences/conf-2001 04_02.
htm (Apr. 2, 2001).
81 Stakeholders' Conference on the Business Impact of the New Chemicals Policy,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/whitepaper/conferences/conf-2002_0521l.htm
(May
21,
2002).
82 Schedule for Stakeholder Workshop on Extended Impact assessment of REACH,
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/enterprise/reach/docs/conferences/eiaworkshop-2003 11-21.pdf (Nov. 21,
2003); Extended Impact Assessment of the New Chemicals Policy, http://europa.eu.int/
comm/enterprise/reach/eia.htm (last modified Feb. 16, 2006).
13 Commission
Publishes
Draft
New
Chemicals
Legislation
for
Consultation,
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/03/646&format=HTML&aged=l&langua
ge=EN&guiLanguage=en (May 7, 2003).
8
For an analysis, see Internet Consultation on Draft Chemicals Legislation (the REACH System),
http://europa.eu.int/yourvoice/results/253/index-en.htm. Of the 968, only 80 indicated that they had sent
comments additional to those presented through the interactive tool; about 60% of the filings were made
on behalf of individuals. 587 filings came from Germany; no other country contributed more than 81
(U.K.). For the comments attached to these filings, see Stakeholder Reactions, http://europa.eu.int/comn-/
environment/chemicals/pdf/ipm stakeholder reactions.pdf.
8 Internet
Consultation on
Draft Chemicals
Legislation
(the REACH
System),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/chemicals/consultation.htm (last modified July 15, 2005);
Contributions to the Public Consultation on REACH, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/
consultation/contributions.htm.
"6 See,
e.g., European Commission, REACH Regulation Public Intemet Consultation,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/docs/consultation/others/886-other.doc (where 156 identical
comments from the workers of Clariant, France).
87 Each such comment fills sixty-five computer screens in this case.
n Internet
Consultation on Draft Chemicals
Legislation (the
REACH
System),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/chemicals/consultation.htm (last modified July 15, 2005).
9 Chemical Reaction, http://www.chemicalreaction.org.
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site, helps one to understand the unusual character of the Commission's role.
Supporting the proposal, and stating a fear that chemical manufacturers will be
working to weaken it, the declaration site features an interactive map with countryby-country links to lists of members of the European Parliament, organized by
district and indicating which members have already pledged to support the proposal
and which have not. Clicking on a supporter's name activates a short congratulatory
email to which the sender may add additional thoughts and must add identifying
information; clicking on a member who has not yet pledged support activates a fourparagraph e-mail calling for support-again, a communication offering little more
than the feelings of a constituent, and to which, again, the sender may add additional
thoughts and must add identifying information. The point is that these e-mails will
be going to members of Parliament, not the Commission-people with
constituencies and votes, not those responsible for technical analysis and drafting.
The European process appears to have succeeded to a significant degree in severing
politics from policy analysis at the legislative level, and making of the latter an
unusually interactive and transparent process.
Nothing of the kind exists at the legislative level in American politics. All, in
effect, is politics. Similar mechanisms exist for conveying a point of view to one's
legislators, as anyone who has come within range of the mailing list for moveon.org
or its competitors well knows. But a centrally managed, multi-year process of
consultation during the drafting process, organized by those responsible for drafting
and not by those who hope to influence them politically, is simply unknown.
Stakeholder consultation is not necessarily broad-gauge. The consultations page
for DG Employment and Social Affairs remarks that, "[c]onsultations on
Employment and Social Affairs issues are as a rule with Social Partners (employers'
organisations and trade unions). A full list can be found on the European social
dialogue - Main joint texts page." 90
A recent Commission Secretariat document, briefly discussing experience with
public consultation and reporting "a growing public consultation culture," seems to
suggest more generally that consultations with established partners are preferred. 9'
Yet in its inception, as Francesca Bignami has pointed out, the move to "civil society
participation," a striking departure from national expectations about lawmaking in
Europe, was intended to secure a broad political base, not to reflect established
corporativist practices.
What then.., was the Commission doing by saying it would consult "civil society?"
No less than that it should continue to rule because it was closer to the good
government ideal of today. The overtly political nature of the White Paper makes
interpretation unnecessary. The Commission was explicit:
Better consultation and involvement, a more open use of expert
advice and a fresh approach to medium-term planning will allow it
to consider much more critically the demands from the Institutions
90 Employment and Social Affairs--Consultations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/
consultation en.html; see also Key Documents, http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment-social/
social dialogue/docs en.htm.
91Report on European Governance (2003-2004), SEC(2004) 1153, § 2.2 (Sept. 22, 2004); see also
Reportfrom the Commission: "Better Lavmaking 2003," at Annex 2, COM (2003) 770 final (Dec. 12,
2003).
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and from interest groups for new political initiatives. It [the
Commission] will be better placed to act in the general European
interest.
And hence, to finish the thought, the Commission should retain its position at the
epicenter of European integration:
Both the proposals in the White Paper and the prospect of further
enlargement lead in one direction: a reinvigoration of the
Community method. This means ensuring that the Commission
proposes and executes policy; the Council and the European
Parliament takes decisions; and national and regional actors are
involved in the EU policy process.92
D. Lobbying and Its Regulation
3
The Commission has adopted a relatively detailed code of conduct for itself albeit one that has not prevented the whiff of public scandal 94-but in other respects
the European Union thus far seems to have found it unnecessary to adopt more than
hortatory measures to deal with lobbying activities. The Commission's Code of
Good Administrative Behavior,95 directed to its staff, lacks any detailed provisions
on conflict of interest; staff regulations on conflicts of interest and external activities
are brief and concerned principally with employment during or after service with the
Commission that might be inconsistent with Commission responsibilities. 96 Its
various communications on consultation and dialogue, similarly contain no
provisions corresponding to American lobbying legislation. A 1999 communication
to the Commission asking about lobbying regulation produced this response from
Mr. Santer:
The obligation for American companies to declare their lobbying
activities, including the amount they spend on such activities,
derives from the registration system which applies to all
organisations lobbying U.S. federal bodies.
This registration system is not compatible with the Commission's
approach, which is based on openness to all interest groups and
guarantees them equal treatment while recommending that they

92 Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and Supranational Interests,

11(2) COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 323 n.356 (2005) (citing White Paper on European Governance, at 33-34,
COM (2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001))..
13 Code of Conduct for Commissioners, http://europa.eu.int/comm/reform/2002/code-conduct-en.
htm.
94 The code provides, inter alia, that a Commissioner should not accept a gift valued at more than
EUR 150. Id. In April 2005, Katrin Bennhold was among those reporting that Commission President
Jose Barroso, had spent an undisclosed week aboard a Greek billionaire's yacht, valued by one newspaper
reporting the scandal at $26,000. Because this was "a holiday with friends" the Commission's position
was that there was no "lack of respect of the code of conduct." Katrin Bennhold, Commission chiefs trip
raises EU ethics questions, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, April 19, 2005, at 1.
95 Code of Good Administrative Behavior, http://europa-eu.int/comm/secretariatgeneral/code/
index en.htm.
1 Reforming the Commission, Simplification of the Staff Regulations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
reform/2002/chapter06_en.htm#1.
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apply a system of self-regulation.
This being so, the Commission has no plans 9to
adopt measures
7
which would require a radical change of policy.

No such measures appear to have been adopted. The encouragement to selfregulation Commissioner Santer mentions appears in a Commission communication
of 1992 explaining that
special interest groups are best placed to establish and enforce
codes of conduct. The Commission therefore invites the sectors
concerned to draw up such codes, which should include the
following minimum requirements.98
Those requirements are stated in quite general terms-advising, for example,
that a group should not "offer any form of inducement to Commission officials in
order to obtain information or to receive privileged treatment," but giving no
concrete detail about the propriety of hosting luncheons, sending holiday gifts, or
providing golfing trips to Scotland for dear friends. 99
The European Parliament, too, has what may be described as minimal rules on
the subject, requiring accreditation of lobbyists and quite general standards of proper
behavior.' ° Its website carries an extensive list of accredited lobbyists resulting,' 0 '
making evident that lobbying the Parliament is a major activity.,0 2 In late April,

97 Answer given by Mr. Santer on behalf of the Commission, 1999 O.J. (C 348)
70.

" Minimum requirements for a code of conduct between the commission and special interest
groups, http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat-genera/sgc/lobbies/communication/annexe2 en.htm.
" The reference is to a distinctly American scandal. See Philip Shenon, Inquiry on Lobbyist Casts a
Shadow in Congress, N.Y. TIMEs, April II, 2005 at Al. Rules of the American Congress regulate with
elusive precision the meals and other benefactions members are permitted to receive.
1oo
Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament (16th ed. July 2004), Rule 9(2) and Annex IX,
available
at
http://www.europarl.eu.intlomk/sipade3?PUBREF=-//EP/fFEXT+RULESEP+20040720+TOC+DOC+XML+VO/EN.
1o1
European Parliament, Accredited Lobbyists, http://www.europarl.eu.int/parliament/expert/
staticDisplay.do?id=65&language=en&redirection.
102Jerome Glass, Why throw a spammer in the lobbying machine, 11(15) EUROPEAN VOICE,
Apr.
21, 2005, available at http://www.corporateeurope.org/europeanvoice2l0405.html.
Glass reports
"estimations of the number of lobbyists working around the EU institutions ranging from 15,000 to more
than 20,000" and that:
The European Commission is to discuss at the end of the month a communication
on lobbying from Sim Kallas, the vice-president in charge of administration and
the fight against fraud. Following this, a Green Paper on the sector will be
launched, Kallas hopes before the end of the year. As part of the debate opened by
the Green Paper, the Commission will organise a roundtable with stakeholders, to
exchange views on the right approach to take. Kallas's stated aim is to regulate
lobbying without increasing red tape. The commissioner expects that a proposal on
a set of rules or a "voluntary code of conduct" will emerge sometime next year. He
says a voluntary code of conduct is preferable to laws, for the time being. But if
voluntary rules did not work, the Commission might consider binding measures at a
later stage.
On April 22, 2005, the author could find no trace of these matters on Commissioner Kallas's website,
Siim Kallas-Vice President, http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissionbarroso/kallas/index.htm.
Glass further reports that the EU's approach to the risk of imbalanced lobbying, rather than curtailing
communications that "help to inform lawmakers" has been to fund Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) in order to balance out lobbyists from industry, which still account for around 70% of the total.
In addition, many lobbying companies in Brussels have signed up to a voluntary code of conduct which
contains guidelines on good practice and professional behaviour.
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2005, it appeared that political pressures were growing to create more formal
structures, including an independent watchdog organization, in the wake of
embarrassing disclosures of vacations taken with friends who were also persons
interest
highly interested in the EU's affairs. 10 3 That appearances of conflict of
14
might arise from genuine friendships in political circles is hardly unknown. 0
E. The Commission's Internal Processes
This does not seem an appropriate place to explore in detail the Commission's
internal processes, which in any event are (appropriately, to the extent they are truly
internal' 0 5) not open to public view. One characteristic, however, seems appropriate
to underscore for persons seeking comparisons, however implicit, with American
institutions-that the Commission is fundamentally a collective, its President (as a
prime minister) primus inter pares but the group taking action collectively. When
one considers as well the President's election by the European Parliament, the
required distribution of Commissionerships and responsibilities for the
Commission's various directorates among citizens of the several nations of Europe,
Parliament's own need for confidence in the several Commissioners, and the
Commission's character as the exclusive drafting agent for proposed European
legislation, it becomes apparent that American concerns with a unitary President, and
debates over the strength or weakness of his command over the rest of executive
government, would be misplaced. Consensus is, of necessity, the road to decision.
And this very reality contributes immeasurably to the Commission's commitments to
transparency, consultation, and the effort at objectivity in its dealings with the outer
world.
As Francesca Bignami so persuasively argues in the context of the Union's
procedural development generally, the structure of the EU may be such as to make
its actors-and perhaps especially the Commission-sensitive to the expectations of
its more demanding members. The incentives for Europe's bureaucrats are quite
different to those American agency staffs might experience-not only that consensus
should be achieved on the particular matter they are proposing, but also that Member
States and their populations on an ongoing basis perceive EU processes as attentive
to their concerns:
Notwithstanding that procedural rights emerged in different
historical periods and that they were informed by different cultural
traditions and supranational interests, they display one striking
common characteristic: they afford citizens a greater set of
entitlements against European government than in their place of
One
origin. What accounts for this surprising outcome?
contributing factor is the weak nature of the Commission as a

oBennhold, supra note 94.
'4 For example, Justice Scalia's refusal to recuse himself in a case involving Vice President Cheney.
See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004). For a similar, if
understated, view, see Get Connected, supra note 29, at 43.
'o-Transparency legislation in the EU as in the United States exempts from public disclosure predecisional internal discussions, as conducive to candor and efficiency in bureaucratic practice. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
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government organization. The Commission relies on cooperation
from national administrations and national courts in enforcing
European law. It does not have a police force that it can call into
action, European courts in which it can directly appear to seek the
execution of orders, or jails into which it can put recalcitrant
citizens. . . . It is not led by a popularly elected official, as are
executive branches at the national level-... [but] by a College of
Commissioners, headed by a President, that is appointed by
common consensus among the Member States, with some input
from the European Parliament. In no way can the Commission be
said to enjoy an electoral mandate when it undertakes its mission
106

Thus, one could believe, to earn credibility the Commission's impulse must be to a
highest rather than the lowest common denominator. 107
Further reflection of these realities is perhaps to be found in the measures the
Commission has adopted for transparency in its dealings with experts, and for
explaining the proposals it ultimately makes for Council and Parliamentary action.
In 2002, the Commission issued guidelines defining core principles and
guidelines for collecting and using the advice of experts outside the responsible
Commission DG.' 0 8 These require it, in the first instance, to maintain a level of inhouse expertise enabling it to act as an "intelligent customer" when organizing and
acting on external expertise. The use of internal resources is preferred. If outside
help is to be sought, the scope and objective of the experts' involvement, and the
questions they will address, are to be set out clearly.
Both mainstream and
divergent views are to be considered, and departments are to maintain a record of the
process including the terms of reference and the main contributions of different
experts or groups of experts. The experts themselves, and also the Commission, are
made responsible for monitoring any possible conflict of interest issues that could
jeopardize the quality of the advice.
And transparency is also a central
consideration: experts must highlight the evidence (e.g., sources, references) upon
which they base their advice, as well as any persisting uncertainty and divergent
views; within the framework of freedom of information legislation, the principal
documents associated with the use of expertise-in particular the advice itself-are
to be made available to the public as quickly as possible;' 0 9 and departments are
encouraged to permit public attendance at expert meetings, particularly on sensitive
policy issues. Finally, departmental proposals for Commission decision are to be
accompanied by discussion of the expert advice (whether or not it has been
followed) and this information is generally to be made public when the
Commission's proposal is formally adopted.

' Bignami, supra note 92, at 352.
i'7 See Francesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations After Enlargement,
in LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION 97 (George A. Bermann & Katharina
Pistor eds., 2004).
log Communication on Principles and Guidelines- "Improving the knowledge base for better
policies, " COM (2002) 713 final (Dec. 11,2002).
09
' See European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of 30 May 2001 regarding
public access to European Parliament, Council and Commission documents, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43.
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F. Explanation
The obligation to explain proposals is treaty-based. Intended to inform the
subsequent political processes (and thus generally met by preambular material in
legislative proposals rather than separate explanations of "basis and purpose"), it is
subject principally to political enforcement-by the Council or Parliament rather
than the courts. EC Treaty Article 253 requires that all regulations, directives, and
decisions adopted by the Parliament and Council jointly, by the Council alone, or by
the Commission, "shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall refer to
any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained by this Treaty." This
treaty requirement is normally thought to be satisfied by the recitation of "whereas"
clauses at the beginning of EC legislation. Such recitals, however, only set out
seriatim a set of relevant facts or factors, and do not explore trade-offs or the real
reasoning of the decision.
In addition, the Commission accompanies its legislative proposals with
explanatory memoranda setting out the results of consultations, and available in all
languages. As characterized in the recent U.K. Better Regulation Task Force
report,1 ° these memoranda typically run to about eight pages and, by the
Commission's own account, often do little to reveal how responses to public
consultations were taken into account. They are not the kind of explanation
American courts would seek as an adequate reasoned explanation of a rulemaking
decision.
IIl. CREATING IMPLEMENTING MEASURES
One question that might be raised about European legislative acts generally is
whether they are prone to leave unsettled questions requiring further lawmaking by
inferior authorities. This is, of course, the dominant experience in American
administrative law, and the engine of the contemporary interest in and importance of
rulemaking procedures. Two decades ago, Ed Rubin underscored the increasing
difficulty of the "delegation" problem in American perspective with his observation
that Congress had virtually ceased solving problems legislatively-that it had
moved, rather, to the habitual creation of regulators through what he styled
"intransitive" legislation. As public choice analyses of congressional action are also
prone to point out,"' this is not simply the product of legislative incapacity to
resolve all details, so that the creation of subsidiary standard-setters is a practical
necessity; it also reflects the discovery of a technique for having seemed to act,
without ever having to do so in a manner that entails political responsibility for the
consequences. The agency, executive or independent, will actually set the standards;
and consequently the agency's leadership (or the President), not the Congress, will
have to pay any political price.
By contrast, EU legislative acts are often prolix, confronting in detail issues of
Get Connected, supra note 29, at 39.

0"

..See,

e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY:
THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).

HOW CONGRESS ABUSES
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the kind the American Congress most often leaves to regulators. EU legislative acts
address a particular, relatively detailed subject-the constraints on genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) in European agricultural markets-and identify with
some precision the "essential requirements" of that subject that others are required to
honor in implementing legislation or regulations. In these characteristics, they much
more closely resemble EPA regulations bearing on state implementation plans than
they do congressional statutes intransitively creating problem-solvers who are to act
on the basis of multiple, essentially political factors. Might that not suggest that EU
legislation leaves little to do, few details to be filled out by subordinate legislative
acts? Yet, EU legislation has other characteristics as well. It is shaped by the
constraints of subsidiarity and proportionality, the frequent enough need to find
diplomatic formulations capable of accommodating national differences, and the
contemporary preference for flexible new governance approaches embodying
repeated benchmarking and mutual learning. All these influences suggest that, for
all their seeming detail, EU legislative acts will often leave considerable leeway and
discretion. 12 Indeed, on a numerical basis EU implementing measures dominate EU
legislative acts, just as in the United States regulations dominate statutes. In 1996,
for example, the European Parliament and Council adopted 484 "legislative" acts; in
the same year, following very different processes and under rather light supervision,
the European Commission adopted
5147 "regulations," with a great deal of
3
uncounted "soft law" below that."
Actions corresponding to American agency rulemaking take a variety of forms.
When the EU has issued a "directive," setting framework standards that require
implementing measures, these measures are commonly-but not invariably-taken
by Member States subject to EU controls for their adequacy. Because the
procedures for creating these implementing measures are set by national law, they
will not be addressed here; nonetheless one considering the means by which law is
shaped in Europe must always consider that national implementation is a major
element, and the procedures and expectations operating at that level inevitably shape
the European experience. Even if in the first instance it is for member states to
exercise the freedom of approach that "directives" intentionally leave, however, it
may be necessary to adjust the dimensions of that freedom from time to time, as
experience develops; and it will be necessary to reach judgments over time what
112In

correspondence, Bignami writes:
[T]he Data Protection Directive (adopted in 1995, in force since 1998), which I'm
doing a case study on, is an example of a lot of leeway and discretion being vested
in the member states. Essentially, once the text of the proposed Directive made it
to the Council, the MS couldn't agree on anything, so they agreed to disagree or
make the terms so vague that most existing systems would be accommodated. And
I'm becoming a bit concerned by the bias being generated by this aspect of
information privacy which I didn't anticipate.
E-mail from Francesca Bignami, Professor of Law, Duke Law School to Peter Strauss, Betts Professor of
Law, Columbia Law School (Dec. 21, 2004) (on file with the author).
..The draft constitution would have identified these subsidiary norms, now described generally as
implementing measures, as "European regulations"---"non-legislative act[s] of general application for the
implementation of legislative acts and of certain provisions of the Constitution," whether they applied
directly to individuals, as the legislative acts now denominated "regulations" do, or they applied to
Member States made responsible for their implementation, as do the legislative acts now denominated
"directives." Draft Constitution art. 1-33. See supra note 5.
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approaches do and what do not honor the directives' essential requirements. And
EU "regulations" creating law directly applicable to private individuals may also
require or at least permit subordinate forms of lawmaking. At least three contexts
for implementing measures directly involve procedures at the EU level,
predominantly in the Commission but to some degree in coordination with external
international or pan-European bodies--comitology, "new approach" standards, and
other forms of reference to external international or pan-European bodies.
Little of this subordinate lawmaking is developed with the detail of American
rulemaking--or, for that matter, the preparation of legislative proposals by the
Commission. Although examples of a process similar to that used for legislative
measures can be found within the EU DGs themselves,'" 4 on the whole
implementation measures are much less in public view or committed to public
participation than legislative acts. The U.K. Task Force for Better Regulation
characterizes comitology, the first and perhaps most prominent of these practices, in
a way that echoes through the whole of the literature:
The main concern we have about the comitology procedure is one
of transparency.
The comitology database that lists the
committees and their agendas is welcome, but information is often
posted too late for stakeholders to influence the discussion. With
participation in the committees restricted to Member State
representatives and institutional actors, together with little public
information, the process can seem a complete mystery to many
people. 15

Thus, as Bignami also reports, 1 6 the pattern of consultation in the EU is quite
the reverse of that in the United States. The following pages discuss in turn
"' For example, the Commission has created, in association with DG Internal Market's Financial
Services bureau, two committees, the European Securities Committee[ESCI and the Committee of
European Securities Regulators[CESR], and it sometimes issues mandates to them in connection with the
implementation of its work. See, e.g., Securities and Investments Funds-Prospectus Directive,
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/internal-market/securities/prospectus/index-en.htm. The CESR maintains a
web-site, http://www.cesr-eu.org, that like the European Aviation Safety Agency lists ongoing and closed
consultations, with relevant links for submitting comments or viewing those that have been made once the
consultation is closed; and these include consultations seeking advice on possible "implementing
measures" for EU directives in the securities field. But these consultations are not to be found on the
DG's own web-site for "your voice" consulting.
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/
consultations/indexcn. htm. And for the former committee, the ESC, all one can find, through the DG
site, is a rather unrevealing collection of meeting minutes. See Securities and Investments Funds-ESC,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemalmarket/securities/esc/index-en.htm; see also Yannis V. Avgerinos,
Essential and Non-essential Measures: Delegation of Powers in EU Securities Regulation, 8 EUR. L.J.
269, 270 (2002). And see the discussion of the European Air Safety Agency, infra note 162 and
accompanying text.
"' Get Connected, supra note 29, at 19.
116Bignami, supra note 92, at 345 ("With the right to civil society participation, the proceduralized
sequence of public notice, opportunity to comment, and government response has been introduced for acts
of a general nature but, for the time-being, only for European laws, not implementing regulations. The
Commission, in reasserting authority after the resignation of the Santer Commission, needed civil society
to justify its role in making the fundamental, political choices contained in European legislation. It had no
strategic interest in involving civil society in what was perceived as the technical domain of rulemaking.
This is precisely the opposite from the American experience. In the United States, regulations must
adhere to notice and comment procedures but congressional statutes, as a matter of constitutional and
statutory law, are free from requirements of public debate before they are passed.").
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comitology, "new approach" standards, and other forms of reference to external
international or pan-European bodies.
A. Comitology
For the Commission itself, implementing measures are most frequently the
product of a process known as "comitology," a process characterized as a means for
consulting Member States." 7 This process is given some structure by the so-called
comitology decisions," 8 whose outlines do not significantly involve public notice or
participation. Most closely supervised by individual DGs, comitology practices vary
considerably from place to place within the Commission; some Directorates (for
example, Employment) employ it hardly at all where others (Agriculture, Enterprise,
Sanco) report hundreds, even thousands, of annual events. The Commission
Secretariat maintains a Register of Comitology covering comitology documents
from January 1, 2003.119 Here one can occasionally find notice of agendas in
advance of meeting, 2 together with an indication who is invited (member-state
representatives and, if useful, member-state designated experts, but not the public);
drafts may be available if Members of Parliament will enjoy a right of scrutiny, but
not otherwise.' 2 1 Given the variation and this general lack of transparency, a report
like this one can do little better than scratch the surface; while the attached sectoral
reports attempt specific examples in their contexts, one is well
advised to consult the
22
particular practice of particular DGs in the current moment.
Comitology procedures have changed considerably over the years, particularly
as Parliament's place has strengthened, and for this reason early studies 123 are of
7

See The European Commission and Civil Society--General Overview, http://europe.eu.int/
comm/civil society/apgenen.htm.
"'See Council Decisions 87/373/EEC, O.J. (L 197) 33, 35 and 1999/468/EC, O.J. (L 184) 23, 26
(Laying down the Procedures for the Exercise of Implementing Powers Conferred on the Commission).
The Council Decisions were further modified by Council Regulation (EC) No. 806/2003, 2003 O.J. (L
122) I (qualified majority) and Council Regulation (EC) No. 807/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 122) 36 (unanimity).
The text seeks only to describe the current state of practice, to the extent that can be known. For an
historical account of its development; see Georg Haibach, The History of Comitology, in DELEGATED
LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 185-215.
" Register
of Comitology,
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/secretariatgeneral/regcomito/registre.
cfm?CL=en.
120A site search for all documents bearing a December 2005 date conducted December 19, 2005
produced 235 documents, the great bulk of which related to past meetings; a search for documents bearing
a January 2006 date on the same day returned six agendas of future committee meetings, only one of
which (a meeting of the standing committee on medicinal products for human use) concerned a draft
measure subject to a right of scrutiny; the agenda was available on the site, but the draft measure would
have to be requested.
121It may be possible to request them, see the report on transparency, but notice does not often
appear in advance of meeting, and in any event such requests often will not be fulfilled in a time
consonant with the committees' actions.
122Many committees used by DGs for advice or similar functions are not Comitology Committees
exercising the powers or subject to the procedures established by the Comitology Decisions. These nonComitology groups may or may be not set up by official Commission decisions; some further
development about them may appear in the sectoral reports. See, e.g., Commission setting up a
consultative group, to be known as the "Experts Group on Trafficking in Human Beings," 2003/209/EC,
O.J. (L 079) 25.
123See, e.g., Eu COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christian Joerges & Ellen
1
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uncertain continued relevance. Because Parliament, as well as the general public, is
somewhat disadvantaged by comitology practice, the draft European Constitution, if
ratified, would have replaced it with a lying-before practice in which Parliament
would have enjoyed an opportunity of disapproval equal with the Council.' 2 4 But
even the draft Constitution specified no greater degree of public participation in the
adopting of implementing measures than currently exists.
Comitology committees consist of Member State representatives qualified in the
particular field, chaired by a non-voting representative of the Commission.' 25 Their
meetings may or may not be preceded by public notice, but in any event they will be
held in small venues, to which only the members and a limited number of "experts"
seconded by members will be invited. The Commission presents a proposed draft of
its intended action-for our purposes, an implementing measure-to the committee
which, after deliberation, delivers an opinion on the proposal. The committee then
acts on the draft by qualified majority under one of four regimes, specified in the
governing documents:
* If a committee is denominated "advisory," its actions are simply advisory in
character; the Commission should respond to negative advice in a final instrument
taking action, but its resolution of the matter takes effect without further formalities.
* If a committee is denominated "management," the style most likely in
agricultural matters or matters with large budgetary implications, failure of the
committee to approve the Commission's draft (or a revised draft) by a qualified
majority must be communicated to the Council, which has three months in which to
take a different position by qualified majority. Unless it does so, the Commission
draft enters into force.
9 If a committee is denominated "regulatory," the Commission's proposal will
come into force routinely if it secures qualified majority support from the committee
or, failing that, if it secures support from the Council within three months-again, by
qualified majority. The Council can amend the Commission's proposal only by
unanimous vote.
Should a qualified majority of the Council oppose the
Commission's draft, the Commission must submit a revised proposal (or seek
legislative action) to effect an implementing measure. However, the Commission
proposal will take effect, even if not approved in committee, if three months expire
without either qualified majority support or qualified majority disapproval being
expressed in Council. As the most demanding of the ordinary forms of comitology,

Vos eds., 1999) (collection of essays).
124 Paul Craig questions the sufficiency of this after-the-fact review to control the Commission's
"significant power over complex regulatory choices." Paul Craig, European Governance: Executive and
Administrative Powers Under the New ConstitutionalSettlement, 3 INT. J.CONST. L. 407, 430 (2005); see
also Paul Craig, The Hierarchy of Norms, in I EUROPEAN UNION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
75-94 (Takis Tridimas & Paolisa Nebbia eds., 2004). It may be noted that a Commission proposal it
characterizes as anticipating "within the framework of the current Treaty, the spirit of the innovations in
the draft Constitution" by placing Parliament and the Council "on a strictly equal footing for controlling
the exercise by the Commission of implementing powers for matters subject to co-decision." Report on
European Governance (2003-2004), SEC (2004) 1153, 14. This proposal has been pending a Council
opinion since April 2004. See European Parliament-Procedure File, http://www2.europarl.eu.int/oeil/
FindByProcnum.do?lang=2&procnum=CNS/2002/0298.
'

25

KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 614-19

(2005) (this description draws on paras. 16-009-014).
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"regulatory" comitology is the principal concern of the following discussion.
0 The fourth style, "safeguard," is a rarely invoked amalgam.
To this conventional description one should add an appreciation for the
increasingly important role of the European Parliament. If, as is now usual, the
underlying legislative act was adopted by co-decision, drafts are also transmitted to
Parliament; Parliament then has a month in which it may adopt a resolution
indicating its view that the draft exceeds the Commission's delegated powers.
Should this happen, the Commission is obliged to reexamine its draft and to report,
with reasons, the action it intends to take. Resubmission to such parliamentary
review is provided whenever the Commission substantially modifies its action from
an earlier draft, if the underlying legislative act was adopted by co-decision.
As appears from the Commission's most recent reports on the working of
committees,12 6 these elaborate provisions are rarely invoked, and committee
contributions are, at least on the surface, minor. Parliament has yet to enact a
resolution characterizing a draft as beyond Commission authority. The very great
bulk of Commission DG proposals are ratified without significant change or
opposition by the committees-and as a result, the Council is rarely consulted, at
least formally. There were no referrals to the Council in 2003; seven, in 2002. Of
course one may say, as the Commission does, 127 that the relative imbalance of DG
and committee or Council work reflects the sensitivity of DG staff to committee and
Council preferences. The claim is very hard to evaluate in the absence of
transparency in the comitology process, however. The drafts the Commission
submits to comitology committees are not published outside the committees;
committee agendas are usually reported (if at all)128 after the fact of meeting; and
minutes of committee meetings are quite summary.
Consider, moreover, the implications of the following table, constructed from
data about regulatory comitology in these two recent reports 129:
DG

2001-03
committees
130

2001-03
regulatory
procedures

2001-03
meetings

2002-03
opinions

2002-03
instruments

132

133

134

131

126 Report from the Commission on the working of committees during 2003, COM (2004) 860 final
(Jan. 7, 2005); Report from the Commission on the working of committees during 2002, COM (2003) 530
final (Sept. 8, 2003).
7 Id. § 1.4 (for both sources).
128 See, e.g., Regulatory Committees, http://europa.eu.int/comm/food/committees/regulatory/index_
en.htm (the comitology page of SANCO, the DG concerned with health and food safety issues).
129 For a similar analysis of earlier experience appears, see Falke, ,supra note 5, at 331,343.
30 Where the number varied, the highest number is given. Variance was minor.
131 Where the number varied, the highest number is given.
Variance was minor. Number of
regulatory committees does not include number reported as operating under more than one procedure, and
so is low.
132 All purposes; statistics broken out by type not
available.
133All types of opinions, whether favorable or not, in all types of procedures
134 This is the measure of implementing measures adopted by the Commission.
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ENTR

33

18

146

1037

953

EMPL

8

3

42

26

5

AGRI

30

4

1039131

2868

2868

TREN

45

21

108

70

43

ENV

35

26

155

137

79

INFSO

13

4

97

90

71

MARKT

12

6

80

14

11

TAXUD

9

4

335

93

88

SANCO

22

9

332

858

636

JAI

7

1

57

33

17

TRADE

13

2

98

123

106

AIDCO

8

2

120

344

320

OLAF

I

1

4

0

0

TOTAL

256

100

5197117

136

The volume of work, together with the Commission's status as the unique
source of implementing measures, strongly suggest that the DGs are, effectively, in
charge. That more than 5200 comitology acts would fail to attract Parliamentary
correction even once, and involve the Council only seven times, may reflect
Commission caution; but it certainly also suggests Commission initiative and
success. In the more active DGs, the number of instruments significantly outnumber
the number of (generally half-day) meetings; the length of SANCO agendas suggests
that discussion of any given item is most often perfunctory.
For EMPL, TREN, ENV, MARKT, TAXUD, and JAI, on the other hand, one
can observe a ratio of two or more meetings per instrument, suggesting that, at least
in these contexts, the committees can be rather deeply engaged with Commission
proposals. Again, direct opportunities for external knowledge and participation are
limited. Occasional accounts one can find in the literature-for example, of the

135

Predominantly management meetings

136May include DGs without any regulatory procedures
37These DGs only; other DGs not using regulatory procedure contributed a not insignificant

additional number of instruments.
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handling of the BSE criSiS138-are certainly consistent with the Commission's
claims. But the process is not one currently open to contemporary observation or
general public participation or influence. 139 And one general account of comitology
practice in ENV, under prior regimes and thus now perhaps outdated, suggests not
only the problems with its "secret life," but quite specifically that, relative to its
committees, and as a matter of practical politics, the Commission is in "quite a
strong position."' 4 °
In the circumstances, the consistent observation that transparency and citizen
involvement are missing at the level of comitology suggests at least the possibility
that engaged oversight is absent because it is ill-informed. The observation is
supported by a search of the Commission's web sites. The Commission's general
overview of civil society and its consultation standards explains, "the consultation
standards do not apply to comitology consultation.' 4 1 The Yourvoice site, again,
references few if any consultations about implementing measures. Individual DG
websites seem little better. And the Secretariat-General's Register of Comitology, as
earlier noted, 142 is also quite limited in the access it provides.
The pharmaceuticals unit of DG Enterprise (ENTR)-one of the more active
DGs insofar as implementing measures are concerned-publishes a not
inconsiderable list of implementing measures for Directive 2001/20/EC
(pharmaceuticals). 143 No link for consultations appears on its website. By
consulting the "news" link that is there,144 one can find invitations to comment on45
draft guidance documents, coordinated with the European Medicines Agency site,
but no information about comitology activities. The ENTR consultations link 46 is
no more informative. The comitology process, mild as it may be, is hidden from
view.
As with legislation, then, it may be that the most interesting aspect in the
development of implementing measures, as with legislative acts, lies in the
Commission's internal processes for developing the proposals on which comitology
acts. Unlike the legislative process, however, it is unclear that these processes,
either, result in exposure to or engagement of the public. It may be that such
invitations are given, without identifying the consultations as ones eventually
destined for comitology. The multiple signals of forthcoming endeavor, and
invitations to engagement, characteristic of the build-up to legislative acts are
13 Schafer, supra note 5, at 20. For the case study on comitology in connection
with GMOs, see
Annette Toeller & Herwig Hoffman, Democracy and the Reform of Comitology, in DELEGATED
LEGISLATION AND THE ROLE OF COMMITTEES IN THE EC, supra note 4, at 25, 37. These were, of course,
both highly controversial matters and so unlikely to be representative of general practice.
139 Toeller & Hoffman, supra note 138, at 22.
140Demmke, supra note 4, at 279, 285, 287.
14' The European Commission and Civil Society, http://europe.eu.int/comm/civilsociety/apgen-en.
htm.
42

See supra note 119.

"' European Commission, Enterprise and Industry DG, Pharmaceuticals, http://pharmacos.eudra.

org/F2/pharmacos/dir20012Oec.htm.
'44European Commission, Enterprise and Industry DG, Pharmaceuticals, http://pharmacos.eudra.
org/F2/pharmacos/new.htm.
14_'
European Medicines Agency, http://www.emea.eu.int.
146The European Commission, Enterprise and Industry, Consultations, http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enterprise/consultations/list.htm.
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missing here.
One way of thinking about the comitology process, strongly suggested by
general concerns about the European "democracy deficit" and in particular by recent
work of Martin Shapiro, is as an element of the "natural tendency for technocracy to
displace democracy" in matters with high science or technological content.' 47 For
Europe, in particular, "the great enemy of successful... transnational regulation ...
appears to be the selfish pursuit of particular national interests by the member states
or rather by their democratically elected, political leaders responding to their
particular domestic constituencies with electoral clout. Transnational regulatory
technocrats become the transnational regulatory heroes in pursuit of the transnational
general interest. . . . The nationality requirement [of comitology committee
membership] is .. .a bow to member state political control .. .[but] in most
instances, the shared professional or expert standards, practices, values, assumptions
and agreed truths of the particular specialized expertise shared by committee
members is likely to overwhelm national differences or indeed any political
considerations."' 148 Shapiro, one might add, is a person not impressed with the
virtues of technocracy,
of "government regulation of what we eat by the deliberation
149
of nutritionists.'
B. EuropeanAgencies as Actors
Comitology is a process that develops implementing measures through the
Commission itself. One might also imagine-and to a limited extent findEuropean legislation creating agencies that, like American independent regulatory
commissions, would be empowered to enact implementing measures in a delimited
field of action.
One reason for the relative unimportance of the "independent agency" as a
source of what Americans would call regulations lies in the Commission's vigorous
defense of what it considers its role as Europe's "unitary executive."' 50 (While the
words are the same as Americans would use, the situation of the EU executive is
necessarily quite different from that of the American President.) Accepting that
regulatory agencies may be created at the EU level, the Commission has asserted
that "[t]he main advantage of using [them] is that their decisions are based on purely
technical evaluations of very high quality and are not influenced by political or
contingent considerations"; while they "can be granted the power to take individual
decisions in specific areas, [such agencies] cannot adopt general regulatory
measures" and "cannot be granted decision-making powers in areas in which they
would have to arbitrate between conflicting public interests, exercise political
discretion, or carry out complex economic assessments.''
This makes it sound like

"7Martin Shapiro, Some Free Associations on Administrative Judicial Review 3 (Draft Paper
presented at the University of San Diego, Jan. 20, 2005) (on file with author).
'49 Id. at 3-4.
1 ld.at 5.
150
Communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the Operating
Frameworkfor the European RegulatoryAgencies, at 2,COM (2002) 718 final (Dec. 1I,2002).
151 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities on the
Operating
Frameworkfor the European Regulatory Agencies, at 5, 8, COM (2002) 718 final (Dec. Ii, 2002); see
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agency adoption of implementing measures is excluded. Yet commentators have
found this a "startling statement," one that "flies in the face of fifty years of
experience with independent regulatory bodies in the United States and Europe,
152
which has shown that it is simply impossible to structure agencies in this way."'
The EU's central website for European agencies15 3 identifies eight as having
regulatory functions, the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market,154 the
Community Plant Variety Office,' 5 5 the European Medicines Agency,' 56 the
European Food Safety Authority, 157 the European Maritime Safety Agency, 158 the
also Governance in the European Union-Better Lawmaking: Decentralisation Through Agencies,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/governance/governance-eu/decentralen.htm.
152 Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Lav and New Approaches to Governance in the
European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. I, 16 (2002). "Agencies" and their powers appear to be at the center of
lively controversy in the secondary literature about even the possibility of separating technocratic
expertise from normative/political/democratic responsibility. See also Christian Joerges, "Deliberative
Supranationalism ": Two Defences, 8 EUR. L.J. 133, 145 (2002) (arguing that the virtue of committees, as
opposed to agencies, is that they offer superior hope (if sufficiently transparent) of mediating between
expertise and democracy in a knowledge society); Giandomenico Majone, Delegation of Regulatory
Powers in a Mixed Polity, 8 EUR. L.J. 319 (2002) (Majone is one of the stronger proponents of the agency
model); Xenophon A. Yataganas, Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The
Relevance of the American Model of Independent Agencies (Jean Monnet Working Paper 3/01, 2001)
(arguing the political necessity of some delegations to independent agencies).
'33The Agencies of the European Union, http://europa.eu.int/agencies/indexen.htm.
Each assesses
fees for its services, and thus is essentially self-supporting.
'4 Office of the European Union, Trade Marks and Designs, http://oami.eu.int.
Concerned with
Community trademarks and design registration; its 2004 annual report is devoid of mention of
"rulemaking" or "implementing measure," and one finds no evident links from its website to such matters.
' Community Plant Variety Office, http://www.cpvo.eu.int/index800.php. This office is essentially
a Community patent office for plant varieties. In 2004, the CPVO adopted administrative guidelines for
determining plant varieties, pursuant to authority granted in Commission Regulation (EC) 1239/95, art.
30, 1995 O.J (L 121) 37.
See European Union Plant Variety Office Guidelines, available at
http://www.cpvo.eu.int/documents/lex/guidelines/VDguidelinesEN.pdf. The site gives no indication of
the procedures followed, nor evident links to similar matters currently under consideration. The
"administrative council" responsible for these decisions does not appear in the organization chart on the
agency's website.
'-European Medicines Agency, http://www.emea.eu.int. Formerly the European Agency for the
Evaluation of Medicinal Products, this agency (connected with the pharmaceuticals unit of DG Enterprise
and Industry) is the European equivalent of the American FDA. It appears to engage in active generation
of guidance documents and standards for both human and veterinary medicine following consultations
that are not obvious from the front page of its site, but presumably are well known to stakeholders. See
EMEA Implementation of the New EU Pharmaceutical Legislation. http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/general/
direct/legislation/legislationhuman.htm (human medicines) and http://www.emea.eu.int/htms/general/
direct/legislation/legislationvet.htm (veterinary medicines). It appears that this information is often also
published on the DG ENTR Pharmaceuticals Unit website, http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F2/pharmacos/
new.htm. The rules of its committees explicitly undertake public consultation on "concept papers, draft
guidelines and general regulatory developments .. .with all interested parties (industry, health care
professionals, patients/consumers or other)." Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Medicinal Products
for Human Use, art. 23, EMEA/CHMP/I 11481/2004, available at http://www.emea.eu.int/pdfs/human/
regaffair/l 1148104en.pdf.
5 European Food Safety Authority, http://www.efsa.eu.int. Given particular impetus
by "mad cow
disease," this agency offers subscriptions for news highlights and notices of consultations on its front
page. Its principal responsibilities concern risk assessment, and it is not clear that any of its products have
the force even of soft law.
158 European Maritime Safety Agency, http://www.emsa.eu.int. EMSA, like EASA, is an adjunct to
DG Energy and Transport, but unlike that agency, discussed in the text following, no "rulemaking" unit or
activity is readily discernable on its website.
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European Aviation Safety Agency, 59 the European Network and Information
Security Agency, 16° and the European Railway Agency. 6' These generally are
constituted in a broadly representative way, with managing committees comprised of
one representative from each member nation; the agencies may often be given
similarly representative "committees" with which to consult. None is openly linked
with the EU's consultative legislative practice; neither the "your voice" consultation
site (in its listing of open and closed consultations) nor the links it provides to
consultations on DG sites directly refer to any of these agencies. Yet, as indicated in
the immediately preceding series of footnotes, and the text next following this
sentence, a quick survey of agency sites for public consultations and the formulation
of implementing measures reveals a considerable variety of activity.
The EASA, in particular, has a directorate denominated "rulemaking,"' 62 that
63
engages in a process strongly resembling American notice and comment rulemaking
(including, in contradistinction to Commission practice, an apparent disposition to draft
its proposals prior to initial public consultation) to generate standards on a variety 165
of
subjects. 64 Like the Commission, it maintains a published rulemaking programme
and undertakes to engage in risk and regulatory impact assessment in connection with its
activities; all submissions are published, and it has established advisory groups of experts
and national authorities with which it undertakes to consult before acting. The rules it
adopts constitute "soft law" in the European understanding; either they are proposals for
Commission action (with or without Council or Parliament participation) that if taken
will render them binding on others or, in and of themselves, they merely indicate a basis
on which regulatory requirements can be honored. That is, where the Commission has
not itself been called upon to act, regulated persons are not obliged to comply with the
EASA standards; but they are assured that they will be found in compliance with
regulatory obligations (created by EU directives, etc.) if they do comply with the EASA
standards.

European Aviation Safety Agency, http://www.easa.eu.int/home.
European Network and Information Security Agency, http://www.enisa.eu.int (established in
March 2004).
161 European Railway Agency, http://www.era.eu.int/.
The Railway Agency is the EU's newest
agency, under formation as an adjunct to DG Energy and Transport, there to join the Maritime Safety and
Aviation Safety agencies.
See European Commission-Rail Transport and Interoperability,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/rail/era/indexen.htm; Organisation Chart of DG "Energy and
Transport," http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energytransport/matthias-ruete/organigramen.html.
162 European Aviation Safety Agency, http://www.easa.eu.int/home/rulemaking-en.html.
63The Agency's website carries direct links both to notices of proposed amendments
'5

'c'

(corresponding to notices of proposed rulemaking in American practice and offering links to electronic
comment forms) and to "comment response documents" where agency staff indicate their proposed
responses to comments that have been filed, in advance of final agency adoption of a rule.
'"See European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002, art. 13(b), 2002 O.J. (L
240) I, 8 (authorizing the EASA to "issue certification specifications, including airworthiness codes and
acceptable means of compliance, as well as any guidance material for the application of this Regulation
and its implementing rules"); see also European Aviation Safety Agency, Decision of the Management
Board concerning the procedure to be applied by the Agency of the issuing of opinions, certification
specifications and guidance material ("Rulemaking Procedure"), EASA MB/7/03 final (June 27, 2003),
available at http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/AboutEASA/ManagBoard/2003/2003_06 17_mb decision
_en.pdf.
165 European
Aviation Safety Agency, 2005 Rulemaking Programme, available at
http://www.easa.eu.int/doc/Regulation/Docs/decisionED2004 09_RM-annex.pdf.
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C. Delegation Out: Reliance on InternationalBodies and European
Standards Organizations
The Commission and expert bodies act together in the formulation of norms in
at least two other contexts worthy of mention, but not elaborate discussion. 166 In
both of these settings, in contrast to comitology, it appears that one can secure
advance notice of the matters to be discussed, and perhaps seek to influence the
discussion.
The first arises where other international bodies are ultimately responsible for
the generation of standards (as for example the Codex Alimentarius Commission
that the FAO and WHO have jointly created to develop standards, guidelines and
related texts concerning food purity). 167 Here, the Commission may use a committee
format to develop joint positions with Member States on matters to be considered on
forthcoming agendas. And for these committees (not comitology committees),
agendas and
discussion papers may be noticed and made available in advance of
68
meetings.
Second, some Commission directives employ what it has denominated the "new
approach" in matters affecting the single market-that is, in American terms, where
one might fear safety or similar concerns are being used by states to mask favoritism
to local industry. 169 New approach directives, in themselves, define only the
"essential requirements" of regulatory controls in technical fields-say, safety
standards for pressurized containers-and not particular means of achieving
compliance with these requirements. They also create Commission mandates to
European standards organizations (rather than "comitology" committees) to identify,
'66See supra note 61, concerning the use of advisory committees early in the legislative drafting

process.
7

16 See FAO/WHO Food Standards CODEX Alimentarius Home, www.codexalimentarius.net.
16sThus, on April 20, 2005, one could find the List of Specialised Committees and Task Forces-

Codex
Committee
on
Food
Additives and
Contaminants
(CCFAC),
available
at
http://europa.eu.intlcommfood/fs/ifsi/eupositions/ccfac/ccfacindexen.html, where the webpage listed a
series of position papers and analyses prepared for the forthcoming meeting of EU Commission and
Member State officials in the Hague, April 25-29, as the Codex Committee on Food Additives and
Contaminants, in preparation for the Codex Alimentarius Commission meeting in Rome July 4-9. The
DG Health and Consumer news bulletin for the day, Sanco-news, carried a link to an item freshly added to
the Committee's agenda that day. Subsequent issues carried similar information about forthcoming
agenda items. No issue of Sanco-news received during the period April 18, 2005-carried any advance
notice of comitology meetings, or links to documents to be discussed at them.
169See, e.g., European Parliament and Council Directive 98/34/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 204) 37.
Experience under this Directive is extensively reported in a Report from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee-The operation of Directive
98/34/ECfrom 1999 to 2001, COM (2003) 200 final (May 23, 2003). A Commission Communication
and an accompanying Commission staff working document, "The Challenges for European
Standardisation,"
available
at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/standardspolicy/role of
standardisation/index.htm, express considerable enthusiasm for experience to date, the hope both for
exploitation of "room for improvement" and the high desirability of "making use of standards in areas of
Community legislation beyond the Single Market " Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council on the Role of European Standardisation in the Framework of
European Policies and Legislation, at I, 3, COM (2004) 674 final (Oct. 18, 2004). The general question
of private standards development, and its relation to governance issues in the EU (and the United States,
and international markets generally) is fully explored in HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE
GOVERNANCE (2005). See especially id. at 50-67, 101-44.
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in technical standards, particular means of complying with these essential
requirements. Commission guidance directs the organizations to adopt these
technical standards only after providing the Commission, Member States and others
notice of their proposals and an opportunity to comment on them during a fixed (and
extendable) stand-still period. 70 It is by this means that, it is hoped, the wheat of
genuine protection can be winnowed from the chaff of favoritism to local industry.
DG Enterprise has established a Technical Regulation Information System (TRIS)
website,17 1 permitting anyone to enroll for e-mail notification of drafts published in
areas of interest, thus assuring broad public opportunity to comment on proposed
technical standards during the "stand-still" period. 72 If they are accepted by the
Commission and officially published, the standards establish presumptively valid
means of satisfying the essential requirements the directives define.
73
The adoption of technical standards has the effect of soft, not hard law' essentially the same as an American business would experience if it followed
"guidance" an agency had issued describing in detail particular actions it would
accept as complying with its regulations. Such assurance is particularly important
where, honoring contemporary preferences for maximizing the initiative left to
regulated industries, hard law instruments have set standards to be met ("essential
requirements," what qualities a safe ladder should have) rather than specified exact
behaviors that are required (exactly how a ladder must be built). Thus, for example,
manufacturers whose products meet the standards have effective protection against
product liability actions. 7 4 National implementation of the same directives is to
honor these standards once created.
One can get the impression that this work is uniquely done by national standardsetting organizations acting in coordination with national authorities. The
Commission's published guide to the New Approach largely speaks in these terms,

7'See Guide to the Implementation of Directives based on the New Approach and the Global

Approach (2000), ch. 4, "Compliance with directives," available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/
newapproach/legislation/guide [hereinafter Guide].
"' DG Enterprise-TRIS, http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/tris. The Commission's 2003 report
discussing this website remarks that "it is essential for businesses to know about [notified drafts], on the
one hand in order to adapt their products in advance . . . and on the other so that they can alert their
governments and the Commission to any unjustified barriers." Report from the Commission to the
Council. the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee-The operation of
Directive 98/34/ECfrom 1999 to 2001, at 31, COM (2003) 200 final (May 23, 2003); see also id. at 36
(attributing "the reactions of the Commission and the Member States [as in] a large part due to the
intervention of businesses"). No reference is made to the value to notice to others.
12 The notices I have thus far received in several months' enrollment have all concerned national
standards, with full text available only in the language of origin. Brief English summaries are provided,
along with the promise of translations in a few weeks time; but no notice of an available translation has
yet arrived.
173
Technical standards "cannot replace a legal text or change what the legislator has provided."
Guide, supra note 170, at 3. "Only the text of the directive is authentic in law." Id. at 4. Note that the
standards, once produced, are not public documents as such; it appears people must purchase them as
transposed by national authorities. The directives themselves are collected at New Approach
Standardisation in the Internal Market, http://www.newapproach.org/Directives/DirectiveList.asp.
"Conformity
'
with a harmonized standard produces a "presumption of conformity with the essential
requirements of the applicable New Approach directive." Guide, supra note 170, at 28. A manufacturer
may choose a different path, but then will have the burden of establishing that its products conform to the
essential requirements.
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and one finds a similar orientation to national standards on the TRIS website. But
the Commission's Report on Experience under the New Approach contains a fourpage list of mandates given to pan-European organizations such as the European
Committee for Standardization (CEN) 175 "following consultation with the Member
States,"'176 to develop Union-wide harmonized standards;177 elsewhere, it lists
twenty-seven mandates issued 1999-2001.17' The CEN website gives, sector by
sector, elaborate reports on the progress of mandated standards through its
processes.7 9 In doing so, it makes evident that it, too, proceeds very largely by
committee action. 180 And a very recent "Communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament" on "Better Regulation for Growth and
Jobs in the European Union" strongly suggests that the future lies with increasing
reliance on this private/public mechanism for law-generation. 8 '

IV. GIVING RELIABLE ADVICE
It remains to address the realm of "soft law," settings in which the Commission
or its delegates seek to develop what, in the American context, would fall within the
realm of general statements of policy, interpretive rules, or staff manuals intended to
structure staff behaviors. In American practice these matters, that might be lumped
together under the rubric "guidance documents" or "publication rules," are generally
free of procedural requirements; the one clear procedural constraint respecting them
is that an agency is permitted to rely upon them to the detriment of a member of the
public only if they have previously been published and indexed, or specifically
brought to the member's attention. Generally, such publications are adopted with
the purpose of governing an agency's subordinate staff, by committing it to act in the
predicted manner when identified facts are presented or found; but while they
doubtless influence public behaviors through awareness of this intent and their
consequent predictive value, they do not, in themselves, create any obligation on
members of the public. Hence, "soft law."
Enough has already been said to indicate that the Commission is often itself a
source of soft law documents,18 2 and that-as in the "New Approach" directives8 3
-it may delegate to others, even outside the EU itself, the authority to create them.
European Committee for Standardization, http://www.cenorm.be/cenormi/index.htm.
Guide, supra note 170, at 28.
117
Id. at 40-43.
178Id. at 12; see also SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 108-09 (The tables make clear that even for the
most important European standard-setters (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) by 1997, the
proportion of purely national standards adopted had dropped below 10%, European standards exceeded
70%, and the remainder were international).
179 See CEN-AII Domains by Subject, http://www.cenorm.be/cenormi/businessdomains/
businessdomains/domains.asp. It appears that drafts as well as final standards must be purchased from
national standards organizations.
180See SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 101-44 (describing CEN and its processes).
"'1Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, COM (2005)
175
176

97 final (Mar. 16, 2005); see also SCHEPEL, supra note 169.
182 E.g., its instructions to staff concerning consultation practice.
accompanying text.
183 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.

See supra note 61 and
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As in its generation of legislative acts (and in its requirements of others), its practice
in developing general policy and instructions to staff is highly consultative, with
these matters appearing in work plans, otherwise well publicized, and made the
occasion for public consultations whose results are both exposed and openly
discussed. Indeed, the bulk of consultations appearing on the Yourvoice website,
directly or through links to DGs appear to fit this category. The practice is grounded
184
in the EU's foundational treaties and subsequent Commission Communications,
although one confidently supposes that strong political incentives as well as these
formal obligations underlie it.
Here, too, these steps are preliminary and tend to be quite structured and pointed
-the Commission exposes the questions on which it wishes public commentary, and
does not present its policy choices until after this consultative process has been
completed. Its questionnaires tend to elicit, and its reports to highlight in their
statistical character, the distributional issues (across Europe, and across stakeholder
constituencies) that its formal commitments arise from. But the firm and explicit
commitment to consultations like these is considerably stronger than1 85
one would find
attached to most American agency processes for generating soft law.
A frequent preoccupation of Commission approaches is with securing breadth of
representativeness-for example, the practice (often mandated although increasingly
difficult with the Union's growth) of including a delegate of each Member State on
committees-while avoiding what is understood as private interest representation.
An association of European automobile manufacturers might claim its place,
alongside a broadly based union of automobile workers and a European association
of automobilists; but Fiat, or the union representing the employees at VW's
Wolfsburg facilities, or the Automobile Club of Stockholm usually could not expect
a committee role. (Each, of course, could respond to public consultations.) The
umbrella organizations are thought to have the capacity, even the responsibility, to
mediate selfish member concerns with some attention to the greater European good.
A somewhat ironic illustration of this tension between assuring transparency and
broad participation, on the one hand, and concern about self-interested activity, on
the other, can be found in the administration of the Commission's implementation of
its Water Framework Directive. 8 6 This important and highly complex measure
seeks to organize river basin management across Europe (and consequently often
184 See The European Commission and Civil Society--General Overview, http://europe.eu.int/

comm/civil society/apgen en.htm (collecting and linking sources). As noted previously, this site is
explicit that "the consultation standards do not apply to comitology consultation." See supra text
accompanying note 141.
185 A notable exception is the FDA, which by statute and internal regulation is committed to
"good guidance practices" producing similar levels of notice and engagement. See FDA Guidance
Documents for Regulated Industry, http://www.fdagov/opacom/morechoices/industry/guidedc.htm. As
that site reflects, the FDA annually publishes a list of guidance under development in the Federal Register,
with an invitation to the public to participate. It maintains an electronic docket, , from which comments
may be filed; it does not appear that the docket itself is populated with any comments that may have been
submitted until proposed guidance has been published.
See Dockets Open for Comment,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/oc/dockets/comments/commentdocket.cfm?AGENCY=FDA.
'
European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/60/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 327) 1 (establishing a
framework for Community action in the field of water policy); see also The EU Water Framework
Directive-Integrated River Basin Management for Europe, http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/
water/water-framework/indexen.html.
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across national boundaries) by establishing a framework for member state
implementation, employing all the perspectives one might expect of such a venture:
water resource development and allocation, pollution control, flood and drought
control, etc. First for pilot river basins, and then for all Europe's river basins
generally, the Directive seeks to generate information and management plans that
will achieve good water status for all European waters by 2015. It establishes a
complex implementing structure of working groups and local river basin authorities
acting under the supervision of a strategic coordinating group and "the European
water directors," a group comprised of national ministers responsible for water
issues and the water director of the EU's DG Environment. The multi-national
character of this collective is the natural product of the national responsibilities
entailed. The collective has undertaken to develop soft law guidance for the staged
implementation of the directive under a "Common Implementing Strategy."' 8 7 A
separate and considerably less public comitology committee, variously called the
WFD Committee and the Article 21 Committee (after the article of the Directive
establishing a comitology regime), works with the Commission in developing any
implementing measures.
DG Environment maintains a library resource, the Communication and
Information Resource Centre Administrator (CIRCA), providing access to
documents and information concerning a number of work groups responsible for
implementing environmental regulations and directives.18 Part of this resource is a
Water Framework Directive library comprising a wide range of guidance and other
documents developed for the WFD under the guidance of the Water Directors;'8 9 the
library included, in particular, a several hundred page document' 9° developed by one
of its working groups and offering extensive guidance how Member States should
fulfill their obligations to provide public participation under the Directive's Article
14.19' As is common, however, and although both Article 14 and this guidance
'87 See
Implementing the EU Water Framework Directive, http://europa.eu.int/commi/
environment/water/water-framework/implementation.html.
For a discussion of the strategy, see Scott &
Holder, supra note 45, at 12 (remarking on the flexibility and reflexivity of the results).
8'Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator (CIRCA), http://forum.
europa.eu.int/Public/irc/env/Home/main.
89
' See
CIRCA-ENV:WFD CIRCA: "Implementing the Water Framework Directive,"
http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l=/framework directive/guidance- documents/.
It
may be advisable first to register as a user of CIRCA, a registration process that is not controlled.
190 Visited Apr. 10, 2005, http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/env/wfd/library?l-/framework_
directive/guidance documents/participation__guidance&vm-=detailed&sb=Title.
'9'
European Parliament and Council Directive 2000/60/EC, art. 14, 2000 O.J. (L 327) I, 16.
Reflecting preambular commitments and supported by disclosure requirements, Article 14 provides:
Public information and consultation
1.Member States shall encourage the active involvement of all interested parties in
the implementation of this Directive, in particular in the production, review and
updating of the river basin management plans. Member States shall ensure that, for
each river basin district, they publish and make available for comments to the
public, including users:
(a) a timetable and work programme for the production of the plan, including a
statement of the consultation measures to be taken, at least three years before the
beginning of the period to which the plan refers;
(b) an interim overview of the significant water management issues identified in the
river basin, at least two years before the beginning of the period to which the plan
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strongly emphasize the need for consultation in advance of action, the library92
contains only completed documents-not opportunities for public consultations.
Portions of the WFD's CIRCA site do contain preparatory documents: working
papers on the basis of which guidance was developed, etc. It is evidently supposed
that the site will be used by the members of its working groups to coordinate with
one another across the continent. To gain access to these aspects of the site, one
must be admitted to membership in the WFD site in particular, either as an observer
or participant. And, as is not true for access to the first level of the CIRCA site, this
requires an application, and permission may be denied.
Interested to learn what he could about the development of the public
participation guidance, the author of this study applied for observer membership in
the WFD site (and also for one other, for working groups for the Noise Directive
also located on the CIRCA site). He informed both groups that he was "a university
professor in the United States researching issues about public participation in
American and EU law, and would greatly appreciate access to the CIRCA materials
on .. .
Although promptly admitted to the Noise Directive working group, he
was rejected for the WFD group with the following explanation:
Unfortunately, we have to refuse your application to the restricted
part of WFD CIRCA on the basis of the criteria agreed in the
meeting of the Strategic Co-ordination Group of 27 November
2001. For your information please find below these criteria.
The restricted part of WFD CIRCA is exclusively reserved for
members of our Working Groups and other experts who are
indirectly involved in our extensive work programme. On the
basis of the information that you provided, we were not convinced
that a private or economic interest could be excluded. For your
information, the following activities fall under this criterium:
consultancy work for other institutions other than the Commission
university studies and projects
individual industry representatives.

Id.

refers;
(c) draft copies of the river basin management plan, at least one year before the
beginning of the period to which the plan refers.
On request, access shall be given to background documents and information used
for the development of the draft river basin management plan.
2. Member States shall allow at least six months to comment in writing on those
documents in order to allow active involvement and consultation.
3. Paragraphs I and 2 shall apply equally to updated river basin management plans.

92 See European Commission, Common Implementation Stategy for the Water Framework Directive
(2000/60/EC): Public Participation in Relation to the Water Framework Directive, Annex Ill (Guidance
Document No. 8
2003), available at http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/env/wfdlibrary?l-/
frameworkdirective/guidance documents/. Annex III reported the working process of the group
responsible for developing it. it begins, "Practice what you preach, is what we believe." Id. at 199. Yet
the account given is entirely of self-chosen consultations with "experts and target groups"; there is no
indication of any open public consultation in the process.
' E-mail from the author to the Communication and Information Resource Centre Administrator
(Apr. 9, 2005) (on file with author).
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In conclusion, we had to refuse
your application for full access to
94
the WFD CIRCA system.1
No recourse was stated or evident.
The WFD undertaking is extraordinarily complex and demanding, and both
economic and national stakes are high. The wish to exclude "a private or economic
interest" is not hard to appreciate, and one may believe too that within the engaged
framework of NGO participants and observers there exists rich opportunity for
knowledgeable critique. 9 5 As remarked at the outset of these paragraphs, there is
inevitably a tension between assuring transparency and broad participation, on the
one hand, and concern about self-interested activity, on the other. That the tension
should be resolved against a general transparency and participation, even in
enterprises devoted to assuring those outcomes, is nonetheless striking.
V. CONCLUSION
The American Congress lacks the contextual incentives to treat its own work of
legislative drafting with anything approaching the rigor and public exposure the
Commission observes in preparing its legislative proposals. But one imagines it
might find in those practices, or American administrative agencies might find for
themselves, genuine opportunities for improvement of American rulemaking
processes as we enter the information age. One of their striking characteristics, in
comparison with our own, is what might be described as their youth-and therefore
plasticity. In the United States, rulemaking procedures are an adult enterprise, and
their encounters with contemporary developments, notably those of the information
age, have produced change only at the margins; in Europe, where conceptions are
much less concretely pre-formed, those interactions seem much more dramatically to
have shaped their growth.
Particularly impressive in this regard is the manner in which the Commission
structures its "stakeholder consultations." The importance of policy is more likely to
drive their use than the formal level at which the text is generated and/or its binding
character; consultations are more likely to be undertaken at the earliest stages of
procedure, pre-proposal, than subsequently, and so it is perhaps less likely that final
policy positions have already been formed.
And the structuring of the
consultations-from the questionnaires used with the "interactive policymaking"
tool the Commission has developed, to the links to relevant documentation these
questionnaires often contain-serves a range of interests important to public
dialogue. It emphasizes the seriousness of the inquiry; focuses it on the matters of
particular interest to the drafter; it permits some statistical analyses of
correspondences between social position and point of view; and, not irrelevantly, it

194 E-mail to the author (Apr. I1, 2005); see also Access to the WFD CIRCA Interest Group,
http://forum.europa.eu.int/irc/env/wfdinfo/data/get%/20registered%/20on/20 wfd0/a20circa.htm.
195 See, e.g., World Wide Fund for Nature & European Environmental Bureau, "Tips and Tricks" for
Water Framework Directive Implementation 29 (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.eeb.org/activities/
water/200403_EEBWWFTips&Tricks.pdf; World Wide Fund for Nature & European Environmental
Bureau, EU Water Policy: Making the Water Framework Directive Work 17-23 (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.eeb.org/activities/water/making-WFD-work-February05.pdf (both much more pleased with
the guidance discussed in text than with its general national implementation by Member States).
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tends to suppress the merely political response by discouraging mass electronic
postcard campaigns. American rulemaking tends to serve up a final and rather fully
developed proposal; and the notice-and-comment process is quite unstructured.
"Well, whadaya think?" invites the whirlwind, in a way the developing EU
techniques of consultation may have a greater potential to avoid.
The highly interactive character of norm-generation in the EU, perhaps
especially in its techniques for developing soft law, is not only an understandable
reaction to the political sensitivities of its position in relation to its Member States.
It may also reflect an important adaptation to the general circumstances of
contemporary government, as hierarchy comes to be replaced by more fluid and
interactive consultative networking. Here, one recurs to the quite fluid interactions
among European institutions and the authorities of Member States; recall that this
discussion has-of necessity--been restricted to what occurs at the level of Europe,
but that much implementation, even of European law, is left to the institutions and
procedures of Member States, under forms of central supervision as often persuasive
as disciplinarian. One must bear in mind, as well, that in the legislative context, if
not the executive, fluid interactivity may be somewhat easier for parliamentary
systems than our own; the greater integration between parliament and government,
the apparent unity of political responsibility for legislation and regulation, has
tended to leave questions of control over regulatory development (like control over
legislative development) to the political scientists rather than lawyers and courts.
The Minister must answer, quite directly, to parliament; and parliament must answer
for the Minister. "This ongoing connection," Peter Lindseth wrote, "helps to
reconcile the reality of delegation (and the agency autonomy that inevitably comes
with it) with the legal-cultural ideals of representative democracy grounded in the
constitutional legislature that most liberal states have inherited from the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries."' 96 Even in the national context, as Lindseth persuasively
continued, "[tihe diffusion and fragmentation of normative power away from
constitutional legislatures over the course of the twentieth century reached a point
that, to some observers at least, it has become questionable to claim empirically (if
not normatively) that the legislature serves as the constitutional principal in the
modern system of regulatory norm-production."' 97 "The complexity of modern
administrative governance has overwhelmed the old notion of a hierarchicallycontrolled 'chancellor democracy' as established by Adenauer in the 1950s. Now
commentators speak merely of a 'coordination democracy,' in which the chancellor
serves only as a policy manager at the center of a highly pluralist institutional
network."'198 In the United States too, despite presidential preferences for a tight
command structure, our future may lie in this direction.
If there are American lessons for Europe, they may lie in the realm between
legislative development and soft law. The political imperative for "comitology" is
clear enough in the sensibilities of the EU's Member States. While the European
196Peter Lindseth, Agents Without Principals?: Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and Fragmented
Governance 3 (University of Connecticut School of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 18,
Feb. 2004),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/l 8.
97
1 id.
'98Id. at 12 (citing STEPHAN PADGETT, ADENAUER TO KOHL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN
CHANCELLORSHIP, Introduction, 18-19, n.19 (Stephan Padgett ed., 1994)).
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Parliament's resistance to it is already clear, the future shape of "implementing
measure" procedure is not. The Commission so consistently follows and encourages
broadly consultative regimes in its other activities, and in those allied organizations
that may be authorized to develop soft law guidance in its stead, that one wonders if
the current obscurity and privacy of its practice in respect to implementing measures
can or should long continue. Here, one might think, the notice and comment
processes that the Commission in fact promotes among European agencies and
standards organizations could find a proper place.

